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FAILURE OF EQUITY: DISCRIMINATORY PLANT
CLOSING AS AN IRREMEDIABLE INJURY UNDER
ERISA
Lorraine Schmall with Nathan Ihnes+
Downsizing and outsourcing are hallmarks of corporate success. At a
time when shareholder and employee suits are daily news, a recent case in
the Tenth Circuit shows another example of corporate miscreance.' There,
when deciding which of several plants to close, managers intentionally
chose the one with thousands of senior employees in order to save money
on the cost of their benefits. 2 An oft-dormant and rarely used provision of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 led to
corporate liability in the amount of thirty-six million dollars paid to
employees and their lawyers in Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. This
provision, section 510 of ERISA, prohibits intentional employer
interference with the enjoyment or attainment of vested or nonvested
employee benefits. 4 An eight-year battle between approximately one
thousand employees and their transnational corporate employer ended with
an alarum for those managers who create schemes to rid themselves of their
most costly employees by basing business decisions, in part, on benefit cost
savings.5 The victory for the workers was less than complete, unfortunately,
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experiences inspired our research after his family suffered directly from pension layoffs due to
plant shutdown; my research assistant Emily Schaar, who took time off from her work for
Amnesty International to cite check; and Linda Trujillo, Leanne Baie and Lisa Hoebing,
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1. See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. See id. at 1248; Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269-71
(N.D. Okla. 2001), rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
3. 368 F.3d at 1249.
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140
(2000).
5. See Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07.
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since they were denied their request for the backpay necessary to make
them whole.6 As such, this irremediable wrong is a failure of equity.
There are a number of rationales for the results in Millsap, and other
similar cases. The best view is that circuit courts have been too wary of
affording expensive relief to litigants who prove their cases against their
firms, and have over-generalized judicial holdings. The cases in which the
United States Supreme Court has ostensibly limited equitable remedies
under ERISA are very different from the straightforward intentional
interference claims inherent in section 510. The courts may have
analogized to factually very different cases when they should have
distinguished them. Millsap is about approximately one thousand long-
tenured, skilled workers whose jobs were eliminated so their employer
could save millions in benefit costs. 7 What their employer did unequivocally
violated the letter of the law. They were wrongfully discharged. The kinds
of remedies typically available in these slam-dunk cases were denied them
by two federal courts that thought the Supreme Court had dictated such a
result, although the High Court's pronouncements never arose in the
context of retaliatory firing." Most of ERISA deals with the protection of
employee benefit trusts, and the relationships among plan sponsors, other
fiduciaries, and plan participants and beneficiaries. 9 Section 510 is the lone
provision that admonishes an employer against taking adverse action
against employees or classes of workers to frustrate their receipt of
promised employee benefits."' As such, it is more a cousin of the federal
civil rights and labor laws that prohibit retaliatory discharges, and a direct
descendant of state wrongful discharge laws. Its uniqueness has not been
recognized as requiring unique remedies. And that inures to the detriment
of ERISA's protected class and purpose of the statute.
The appellate decision in Millsap was wrong. Neither the purpose of
ERISA in general, "to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,"'" nor the specific goal of section
510, an antiretaliation provision, is effectuated by denying the victims of
employer discrimination a meaningful remedy. 2 "The reforms in ERISA
embody a worker-security theory of pensions."' 3 What is most frustrating
about the Tenth Circuit's refusal to affirm the carefully-thought-out remedy
6. See Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1260-61.
7. See Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1264, 1306-07.
8. See Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1255-57.
9. See ERISA §§ 401-405, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105.
10. Id. § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140.
11. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
12. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,143 (1990); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90.
13. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974, at 80 (2004).
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created by the district court is the circuit court's attempt to follow what it
thinks is the law of the case. There is none.
The three plant-closing cases that successfully established section 510
violations' 4 have not been considered by the Supreme Court, and thus do
not create mandatory law. Despite its protestations to the contrary, the
Supreme Court has had neither the time nor the opportunity to develop an
ERISA jurisprudence that is workable, predictable, and can actually resolve
legal disputes before they evolve into complex litigation. It has considered
a handful of ERISA cases each year, each with distinct and unique facts, the
resolution of each not necessarily creating a coherent body of law that may
help with the resolution of the next handful.'5 That is not to say that the
Court has refused to take on hard cases under the thirty-year-old law. The
Court has grappled with the breadth of ERISA preemption in a diverse and
distinct spectrum of challenges. There have been difficult questions about
the relationship among ERISA's promise of a uniform scheme of
administration and judicial review of plan denials and state laws attempting
to impose quality control on the provision of health care. 6 State issues as
diverse as their divorce laws have abutted ERISA, requiring Supreme
Court intervention.' The Justices of the Supreme Court have attempted to
describe and evaluate trustee duties.'8 Even state criminal prosecutions
14. See Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987); Pickering v. USX Corp.,
809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992); McLendon v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J.
1989), affd, 908 F.2d 1171 (3d. Cir. 1990).
15. If the subject matters of ERISA cases presented for Supreme Court consideration
were portrayed in a Venn diagram, there would be precious little overlap.
16. See, e.g., Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 331, 341-42 (2003)
(finding that state statutes, which prohibited HMOs from excluding willing healthcare
providers from their provider networks, were not preempted as relating to ERISA plans);
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,359,362-63 (2002) (holding that an Illinois
independent medical review statute was not preempted by ERISA so an HMO beneficiary
could use an independent medical review in her favor to collect benefits for a procedure which
her HMO had declared medically unnecessary); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,214-15,237
(2000) (finding that a mixed eligibility decision to delay medical treatment by sending patient
to HMO-owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by the HMO through its physician
was not a fiduciary decision under ERISA); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs.
Fund, 520 U.S. 806,808-09,815-16 (1997) (holding that a Health Facility Assessment was not
preempted by ERISA because, while its operation "impos[ed] some burdens on the
administration of ERISA plans, [it did] not 'relate to' them within meaning of [ERISA]").
17. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001) (holding that ERISA
preempted a state statute which "provid[ed] that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary
of a nonprobate asset [was] revoked automatically upon divorce"); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S.
833, 835-38 (1997) (finding that in widow's suit seeking determination of rights to decedent's
undistributed retirement benefits, decedent's sons were improperly granted summary
judgment, as testamentary transfer of benefits to sons by decedent's first wife was preempted
by ERISA).
18. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 884, 888, 891, 895 (1996) (holding
that an employer's amendment of benefits plan to condition payment of early retirement
2005]
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became entangled in ERISA's morass. '9 But these myriad ascendants to the
High Court have not created a workable scheme on most ERISA matters,
especially not in the area of remedies.
It could be argued that a purposive reading of ERISA is inappropriate, in
light of several of ERISA's specific, albeit confusing, provisions that seem
to limit remedies. Certain accepted conventions of statutory interpretation
may mandate the result. This is essentially what the Supreme Court has
said in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,20 Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates,2 and Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell.22 Or, it is possible that the Court majority's statutory divination is
23
wrong.
If we have to assume the Court is right, then another irrebuttable
presumption is that, looking backward from empirical data, Congress did
not actually pass a law that would accomplish the goals found in ERISA's
preamble and legislative history, either because Congress did not want to or
understand how to. To continue the syllogism, perhaps Congress did not
want to end discrimination because, as the law operates, it essentially
24
rewards law evasion or violation. Finally, Congress might have wanted to
benefits on waiver of employment-related claims did not violate ERISA where the employer
was not acting as a fiduciary and payment of benefits was not prohibited transaction);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 1 t5 (1989) (finding an employer's denial
of ERISA plan benefits was properly reviewed under a de novo standard where the plan did
not "give[] the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan").
19. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 367-72,
376 (1990) (concluding that a trial court was without authority to place a constructive trust on
petitioner's pension benefits, despite criminal conduct on petitioner's part, as the benefits were
protected by federal statute and were not subject to alienation); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107,109-10,119-21 (1989) (holding that the state prosecution of an employer for failing to
pay accrued vacation benefits to discharged workers was not preempted because such benefits
were not part of an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA).
20. 534 U.S. 204, 220-21 (2002).
21. 508 U.S. 248, 255-59 (1993).
22. 473 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1985).
23. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 233 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[E]quity,
characteristically, was and should remain an evolving and dynamic jurisprudence." (citation
omitted)); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 38 (2004)
(discussing Justice Ginsburg's "historically constrained evolution" of the law of equity).
24. The argument goes as follows:
A) Employee benefits are voluntary, not tax-supported, and ostensibly desirable;
B) Placing huge transaction costs on employers for law violation may discourage
them from voluntarily providing benefits in the first place;
C) Even without positive law, in many cases, cost equilibrium (e.g., for smaller
employers who can save less on benefits) will keep employers from interfering with
their employees' benefits; and
[Vol. 55:81
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end some discrimination, but ending it all was too onerous for companies
(and capitalism) and ending some was better than none.25 One might
assume even more rationales, e.g., the transaction costs of defensive
litigation as a deterrent to law violation, even where those costs are not
solely economic, or the notion that courts, especially the Supreme Court,
are in some turf war with Congress about who must assume the
responsibility for making laws pragmatic and workable.26 But none of these
arguments or theories explain why an antidiscrimination law does not
punish or prevent discrimination.
PUBLIC POLICY INHERENT IN ERISA'S PROTECTIONS
AGAINST RETALIATION AND INTERFERENCE
Although section 510, according to its sponsors and the Supreme Court,
exists to prevent retaliation against workers who actually have benefits,27 its
meaning and purpose is skewed by the inclination of a majority of the High
Court to decide what equity allows and by an expansive reading of Supreme
Court holdings in radically different factual contexts to apply to the discrete
and infrequent section 510 claim.28 This ERISA admonition against
reprisals adheres to a distinct normative model of appropriate income
distribution among workers in this country, which is based upon vague
meritocratic principles holding that only hardworking and efficient
employees deserve to be retained. Workers who have earned benefits,
D) Employers who might experience significant reputation costs, or those with a
business model that quantifies notions of inherent fairness, will be compliant.
25. See Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism:* A
Socio-Legal Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931,
934-35 (2004) ("[Ajdvocates of Law and Economics contend that efforts to regulate individual
behavior through the law are likely to be futile or have perverse or dangerous consequences.
The argument against regulation is twofold: first, the costs (anticipated and unanticipated) of
regulation often outweigh its benefits; second, regulation is a form of rent-seeking behavior by
cartelizing groups seeking to gain a premium over the market price for their activity."
(footnotes omitted)).
26. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224 (2003) ("The five-person majority that has become
famous for its jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
sovereign immunity has also revised the scope of federal equitable and common law powers.
The emerging legal rules stem from cases-such as Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson-that
may not come trippingly off the constitutional scholar's tongue but must be understood as
working in tandem with the majority's restrictions on the power of Congress to develop new
federal rights. These holdings instruct federal judges not to craft remedies without express
congressional permission, and, when permission has been granted, to read it narrowly.").
27. See ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133,143 (1990); Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA 's Noninterference Provision,
36 B.C. L. REV. 201, 202 (1995).
28. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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arguably by dint of hard work and long-term commitment to a firm, should
be the most deserving.29 But even this exemplary cohort of workers, whose
benefits become too costly, have no guarantee of, and in fact not even the
barest entitlement to, a job or its proxy, or backpay for wrongful discharge.
Thus, the social cost of their unemployment will ultimately be borne, after
impoverishing their families, by the commonweal.30 This frustrates the
public policy embedded in ERISA.
Oddly, ERISA's prohibition against making business decisions based on
benefit costs seems to catapult the ethic of altruism over notions of market
efficiency. It appears that Congress created legislation that is irrational in
an economic sense, but which comports with other antidiscrimination laws.
Since the law is clear-benefit costs cannot motivate discharge3 -then the
only limits on its irrationality can be found in limiting the remedy for the
law's violation. If rational economic behavior shapes and justifies law, then
ERISA can be looked at as a practical equation. If McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC) can save millions of dollars by breaking the law, it
ought to. McDonnell Douglas pays every benefit dollar it would have if it
had kept all the retaliatory-discharged employees in the company's pension
and health plans as part of a settlement.2 But it also fired a contingent of its
highest-paid workers, and now potentially saves five or nine or twenty
dollars per man hour and produces the same product for the same price."
Profit-seeking is the logical role for market competitors. To ignore such an
opportunity at disproportionately more benefit than cost would be
29. It is necessary to put aside the argument that many "senior" employees with good
salaries, pensions, and health insurance may be unwitting beneficiaries of their employer's
historic race, sex, or national origin discrimination. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct.
1536, 1544 (2005) (holding that disparate impact may be sufficient to prove an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act violation).
30. Shunting middle-class, tax-paying, wage-earners into the class of public dependents is
inefficient since the effect is to reduce the number of paying contributors to Social Security
and savings pools. This view mirrors those held by the original proponents of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 88 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)
("There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that permitting people to be hired on the
basis of their qualifications not only helps business, but also improves the total national
economy."). Moreover, pension-sponsoring firms enjoy enormous tax subsidies. See TERESA
GHILARDUCCI, LABOR'S CAPITAL, at ix (1992) ("[W]orkplace pension coverage relieves the
federal government of pressure to expand the Social Security system ... .
31. See ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
32. Compare Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp 1262, 1274 (N.D. Okla.
2001) (finding that the "actuarial asset value of the benefits was $33,199,000" at the time of the
plant closing), rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004), with Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
368 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting the $36 million settlement agreement providing
for "lost pension and health care benefits").
33. See Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71.
[Vol. 55:81
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inefficient. 4  But such logic lends to an inescapable, and completely
unpalatable, conclusion that ERISA was adopted to allow wrongdoers to
make some money even when they lose in court.
If ERISA is instead an avowedly inefficient drag on the market that has
some salutory motives and purposes, then ERISA, as it operates, has failed.
It does not guarantee a return to the status quo for victims. Looked at as a
prohibition against discrimination of some sort, it can only remedy this evil
by making it unprofitable for a market player to discriminate. If the law can
be inexpensively (relatively) violated, then law-abiding is irrational. This
would not be the first time we have sacrificed community efficiency to
guarantee individual rights. For example, this is precisely how many
scholars would describe the New Deal legislation which fundamentally
adjusted the free market system in order to achieve a more distributively
fair equipoise between workers and owners of capital.35 Our laws are laden
with legislative histories and purpose provisions that reflect an impressively
worded commitment to fairness and access. Were one to literally apply the
preambles of such congressional forays into sainthood, no plaintiff would
want for redress.36 But hard choices were made as the laws were applied,
and those choices reflect an even more primordial commitment to the
preservation of capital. The irony is that a firm's logical consideration of
benefit costs are proscribed by ERISA's antidiscrimination provisions,3" and
this fact may have put courts in the position of limiting remedies to make
sense in a business world.
ERISA can be considered a type of tax law, in that tax expenditures
support the creation of private pensions at considerable cost to the
government in lost tax revenues. There is a schema of carrot-and-stick
38benefit provisions in the United States. Congress, and the people who
34. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 127 (2d ed. 1995) ("Do you think that employers make plant closure or other large scale
layoff decisions in ignorance of fringe benefit costs?... Do you think good managers make
such decisions ignorant of such fundamentally relevant information?").
35. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
1932-1940, at 335-39 (1963).
36. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) sponsors provide ready examples of this type
of rhetoric. See Kimberley A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring Americans with Disabilities:
How Far Can Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183-84
(1991). As one ADA proponent windily insisted, "discrimination on the basis of disability in
any form will not be tolerated and people with disabilities will be able to hold their Federal
Government accountable for ensuring the enforcement of their rights." 101 CONG. REC. 8507
(1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
37. ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
38. See Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Ret. Program for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d
454,456 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either the decision
to establish a plan or in the decision concerning which benefits a plan should provide. In
particular, courts have no authority to decide which benefits employers must confer upon their
20051
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elect it, do not want to pay for expensive guaranteed benefits like pensions
and health insurance. Instead, corporations are given tax benefits and
protection from tort claims of unlawful discharge in exchange for their
sponsorship, and, in some cases, funding of employee benefit packages.39
Bottom line benefits inure to firms that offer pensions. Employers enjoy
enormous tax advantages through the creation of pension plans: "'It is
inconceivable that the size of the current private system is not largely
attributable to the special pension tax provisions in the U.S. Tax Code and
the accompanying high marginal tax rates that have prevailed in the code
since WWII.' 40 Congress favors the creation of private pension plans. The
tax expenditure 4' -the loss of federal tax revenues due to the preferential
employees these are decisions which are more appropriately influenced by forces in the
marketplace and, when appropriate, by federal legislation."). As a result, ERISA provides
less protection than state law and can limit the remedies an employee can seek.
39. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("[T]he provisions.., of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title .... ); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 139-42 (1990) (holding that a plaintiff's state common law suit for breach of
contract and wrongful termination seeking compensatory and punitive damages was
preempted by ERISA); Fort Halifax Packaging Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,10-11 (1987) ("It is
thus clear that ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers
establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating
complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce
considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers
with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting
them. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed
by only a single set of regulations."); cf La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 644 F. Supp. 942,
948 (N.D. Il. 1986) (commenting on the general effect of preemption on a plaintiff's chances
against an employer in a retaliatory discharge for complaining about unsafe working
conditions, often times a "removing defendant tows the case into federal harbor only to try to
sink it once it is in port"), affd, 865 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1988).
40. Lorraine Schmall, Defined Contribution Plans After Enron, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 891,
934 (2003) (quoting RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7
(1986)). According to economist Denis Kessler,
firms have a demand for such [pension] schemes. It is remarkable that in all
industrialized countries, corporations have been actively implementing and
extending old-age protection schemes. Therefore it should be of interest to try to
understand the economic reasons underlying the behaviour of firms which lead to
the increase of income transfers to retirees.
Denis Kessler, But Why Is There Social Security?, in WORKERS VERSUS PENSIONERS:
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE IN AN AGEING WORLD 80,87 (Paul Johnson et al. eds., 1989).
41. See JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONGRESS, TAX EXPENDITURES: A REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS (1999), http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tax/expend.pdf. The Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 defines tax exemption as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal
tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 § 3(3), 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2000). The "Tax
Expenditure Budget is essentially an enumeration of the present 'tax incentives,' or 'tax
subsidies,' contained in our [present] income tax system." STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS
[Vol. 55:81
Failure of Equity
treatment of pension plans in the tax code-was $314.080 billion in 2005.42
Tax-favored employment-based retirement benefits alone account for
43nearly seventeen percent of the tax breaks. Of course, these revenues are
not completely lost; their collection is merely deferred. When the former
worker starts receiving benefits from the pension plan, the benefit payment
will be taxed, often at a lower rate, providing some revenue for the federal
government. These kinds of tax expenditures support a strong argument for
the existence of an articulated federal public policy favoring deferred
benefits and preventing their loss through larceny, mismanagement, or
discharge of workers.
Once established, such benefits (or their cost) cannot legally motivate an
employer to discharge employees who enjoy them. But if there were such
an illegal motive, certainly money damages to the discriminatees are
unavailable, since such damages are not "equitable." What kind of quid pro
quo is there for the benefits-awarding employer who gave too much away
and fires those eligible for the benefits? There is no doubt that companies
must receive some benefit if they are to establish plans that cost a great deal
of money. Firms that sponsor plans clearly benefit from them-firms are
assured a better and more stable workforce, and both firms and employees
receive tax advantages through the payment of deferred, rather than
current, compensation. In cases of enhanced benefits and early retirement
incentives, firms also enjoy the advantage of inducing employees to leave
their payrolls with concomitant reductions in benefit obligations. An
examination of the cases suggests that the interests of an employer/sponsor
or plans themselves, as separate funded entities, more often prevail over the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.44
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF ERISA'S PROHIBITED
INTERFERENCE CLAUSE
Millsap is the exemplar for plant-wide section 510 discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas, an aircraft manufacturer, made a decision to close a
TO TAX REFORM 7 (1973). Basically, these expenditures support U.S. public policy. See
NORMAN B. TURE, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON THE ECON. OF TAXATION, TAX
EXPENDITURES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, at i (1990).
42. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FS-180, FACTS FROM EBRI, TAX
EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: AN UPDATE FROM THE FY 2005 BUDGET 1-2
tbl. (2004), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0204fact.pdf.
43. Id. at 1.
44. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law To Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899,910
(1993) (illustrating how free market platitudes and practices often conflict with employee
protections); Steven L. Willborn, Workers in Troubled Firms: When Are (Should) They Be
Protected?, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 35, 52-53 (2004).
2005]
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Tulsa, Oklahoma, plant after promising employees repeatedly that it would
not be sold.45  So far, there is nothing atypical or illegal in such
entrepreneurial decision-making. "In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the
amount of government defense contracting work available to McDonnell
Douglas and other defense contractors was declining., 46 In an effort to
remain competitive, the firm made some difficult choices. Its CEO, John
McDonnell,
issued a memorandum to all employees entitled "The Hard
Reality." In this memo, Mr. McDonnell informed MDC
employees that the company needed to reduce annual
expenditures by $ 700 million a year. These expenditures were to
come from all segments of the company and, according to the
McDonnell memo, would include reductions in force that would
affect the company's employees, of which there were then about
130,000 worldwide.47
The trial court found that "[f]rom the beginning of 'Hard Reality,' MDC
discussed ways to maximize its pension surplus by focusing on the
45. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1264-66 (N.D. Okla.
2001), rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004). Such promises were made repeatedly and with
great fanfare, including a press conference at one of McDonnell Douglas's plants, by then-
president George H.W. Bush, approving the company's manufacture of fighter aircrafts that
the United States would sell to Saudi Arabia. Id. at 1265-66.
Named Plaintiffs James Millsap, Fred Davis and Vera Lehman were employees
with many years of service at MDC's Tulsa facility until the plant closed. Prior to the
facility closing, they recalled being told on multiple occasions that if the company
was awarded the F-15 contract with the Saudi government, the plant would be open
for at least three more years. They were asked by the company to write letters and
to sign cards, not only to their Congressmen but also to the President.
... In response to these requests by MDC, the union and the company's
employees lobbied the Oklahoma political delegation with letters and calls. The
promise of at least three more years of work was made not only to MDC employees,
but also at the job rally at which the President of the United States and several
members of the Oklahoma congressional delegation were present. These promises
were repeated on other occasions by the President of McDonnell Douglas
Aerospace, John Capellupo, and the former general manager of the plant, Al Briggs,
his successor, Don Bittle, and the plant director, Joe White. In addition, members of
the Oklahoma political delegation were heard repeating the same promise to
employees during their various visits to the plant.
... On September 11, 1992, President Bush announced at a McDonnell Douglas
job rally held in St. Louis that he had approved the $9 billion sale of the 72 F-15's to
the Saudi government. This message was broadcast to employees and the public at
the Tulsa plant, where a similar rally was underway.
• . . The company's public relations staff took this occasion to repeat the
representation from its 1991 Annual Report.
Id.




relationship between plant closings and older, more senior workers
approaching eligibility for pension and other benefits., 48 In order to
monitor its pension savings, the firm kept track of the average age and
length of service of the employees it laid off.49 Even this corporate behavior
is both rational and legal. However, it ultimately became clear that
McDonnell Douglas chose to close its Tulsa plant with the prohibited intent
of getting rid of those workers whose continued accrual of, or permanent
vesting in, expensive pension benefits made them the most costly among its
cohort.
50
At that point, McDonnell Douglas violated the retaliatory discharge
provision of the law that federally regulates employee benefits." When a
business decision is based in part on the age of the workers discharged or on
predictions about pension savings, section 510 of ERISA protects affected
employees from loss of benefits.52 It declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan.., or for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan ...."
Ordinarily, proving that an employer intended to interfere is difficult, and
it is often impossible to rebut any legitimate "other" explanation for the
change in job status. But, in Millsap, an Oklahoma district court found that
the company violated ERISA by closing a plant with the intent to shed
employees whose benefit costs were high or who were on the verge of
vesting in pensions. The court found "smoking gun" evidence of the
company's illegal motives. 5 The evidence included certain memos from
outside actuaries that presented and analyzed the savings available if
benefits were reduced.56  One memo "consider[ed] various 'what if'
scenarios, analyzing the effect on costs and savings if the company decided
48. Id. at 1268.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1307.
51. Id.
52. See ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07. McDonnell Douglas settled the case for $36
million for pension and healthcare deficiencies and $8.1 million in backpay. See Robert
Boczkiewicz & David Harper, Court Rules Against Employees, TULSA WORLD, May 22,2004,
at A15; Clayton Bellamy, Associated Press, Federal Judge Approves McDonnell Douglas
Settlement (Sept. 2,2004) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review). The payment to
each employee averaged $5,800.11. Id.
55. Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-69.
56. Id.
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to reduce heads."57 The financial experts examined "'pension cost, savings
cost, savings plan cost, health care cost, and just direct overhead cost."'58
While such incontrovertible evidence rarely exists, it did in Oklahoma, and
the result was a finding that ERISA should have protected employees from
this adverse action. But, in this most unusual of ERISA claims, the
plaintiffs were not granted the "make-whole" remedies they sought. This is
so because of the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that ERISA remedies for
certain named violations of the Act, including the non-interference
prohibition, were purely equitable. 9  The appellate panel read
proclamations from the United States Supreme Court about the breadth of
60equitable remedies under ERISA as precluding backpay.
57. Id. at 1269.
58. Id. (quoting Deposition of Richard Smoski at 7).
59. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1258-61 (10th Cir. 2004).
60. See id. at 1257 n.15 (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 221 (2002)); id. at 1260 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253, 261-62
(1993)); id. at 1259 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,142 (1985)). Other
circuits have followed the Supreme Court's lead, adopting its reasoning even in factually
distinct cases. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, 400 F.3d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a "make whole" remedy, including unpaid
medical bills, for the period during which a fiduciary breach led to their temporary loss of
insurance); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401,403-05 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
ex-spouse of a plan participant who continued to pay premiums on his life insurance was
denied proceeds when he died, despite trustees' failure to notify her that she was ineligible to
pay); Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1162-63 & 1163 n.16 (10th Cir. 2004)
(referencing Millsap for the proposition that ERISA sometimes leaves employees without
remedy in case alleging fiduciary breach by an employer who induced employees to retire
without telling them what pension benefits they stood to lose), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2961
(2005); De Pace v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 257 F. Supp. 2d 543, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that plaintiffs induced to retire by employers' misrepresentation can proceed, but
remedies are sorely limited).
In essence, Great-West Life dictates that plaintiffs' claims for compensatory
payments equal to the difference between the benefits they received and those they
were promised is not a viable remedy under § 1132(a)(3) because "[a]lmost
invariably ... suits seeking.., to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the
plaintiff are suits for 'money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied,
since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's
breach of legal duty."
Id. at 561-62 (alterations in original) (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210). The plaintiffs'
claims here for compensatory and punitive damages are illustrative of the type of tort-related
monetary remedies that were not typically available in equity, and fall outside the Supreme
Court's formulation of equitable relief.
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THE PURPORT AND PRACTICE OF ERISA'S REGIME OF
REGULATION
ERISA does impose certain clear obligations upon companies that offer
benefits to their employees.6 Both pension and health plans are subject to
12four major requirements in addition to minimum vesting and funding
standards." Employers must report the type and quantity of benefits to the
Department of the Treasury,64 employers must disclose the content and
procedure of plans to employees and their beneficiaries,65 companies cannot
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees, 66 and any person
who exercises control over ERISA funds must assume certain basic
fiduciary responsibilities. 6 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]s
part of this closely integrated regulatory system Congress included various
safeguards to preclude abuse and 'to completely secure the rights and
expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation.' 68 The
Supreme Court explained that "Congress viewed this section [510] as a
crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to
circumvent the provision of promised benefits. 69 With ERISA decisions, as
is true in all of law, interpretations and prejudices have come into play even
with the most "literal" statutory interpretation.7 o
61. See ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000) (stating which plans are covered).
62. Id. § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
63. Id. § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082.
64. Id. §§ 101, 103-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1023-1025; see also I.R.C. §§ 105-106 (2000).
ERISA is jointly enforced by the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service;
hence, both Titles 26 and 29 of the United States Code are referenced.
65. ERISA §§ 101-102, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1022.
66. Id. § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (a). This requirement has been interpreted to mean that
a company president cannot offer benefits to herself and her cronies while excluding all other
employees. See id. § 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1). However, deferred compensation
pension plans which are unfunded and which benefit only a select group of highly
compensated employees may be exempt from ERISA. See Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631,
637 (3d Cir. 1989).
67. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
68. Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,137 (1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-
127, at 36 (1973)).
69. Id. at 143.
70. See Wharton Scholar Sees Trend to Economic Approach to Labor Issues, 7 LAB. REL.
WK. (BNA) 781, 781 (Aug. 11, 1993). Professor Janice R. Bellace has suggested that
"efficiency arguments may simply be a device to conceal policy choices." Id. She argues that
Justice Scalia has emphasized one goal of ERISA, "containing pension costs" while at the
same time "discounting or thwarting ERISA's primary purpose of giving plan participants
greater protection than they enjoyed at common law." Id.
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
The antiretaliation provision of ERISA, section 510, actually provided
the Supreme Court with an early opportunity to explain the breadth of
ERISA preemption in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.7'
[Respondent Perry] McClendon had worked [as a salesman and
distributor of construction equipment] for nine years and eight
months [when] the company fired him[,] citing a companywide
reduction in force. McClendon sued the company in Texas state
court, alleging that his pension would have vested in another four
months and that a principal reason for his termination was the
company's desire to avoid making contributions to his pension
fund.72
He lost at the trial level, but the state supreme court reversed and
remanded for trial, holding that public policy required recognition of an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 73 The majority concluded
that "the state has an interest in protecting employees' interests in pension
plans., 74 As support, the court noted that "[tihe very passage of ERISA
demonstrates the great significance attached to income security for
retirement purposes., 75 The court reasoned that McClendon was seeking
future lost wages, recovery for mental anguish, and punitive damages,
rather than lost pension benefits, and was, therefore, not subject to federal
preemption and removal.76
The Supreme Court reversed.77 Justice O'Connor wrote the decision,
finding that the "claim falls squarely within the ambit of ERISA § 510, ' , 78
which
protects plan participants from termination motivated by an
employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting. Congress
viewed this section as a crucial part of ERISA because, without it,
employers would be able to circumvent the provision of promised
benefits. We have no doubt that this claim is prototypical of the
kind Congress intended to cover under § 510 [of ERISA].79
71. 498 U.S. 133, 135 (1990).
72. Id. at 135-36.
73. Id. at 136.
74. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69,71 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133
(1990).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 71 n.3.
77. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 137.
78. Id. at 142.
79. Id. at 143 (citations omitted) (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35-36 (1973), and H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973)); see also Tobin v. Nadeau, No. Civ. A. 03-11817-DPW, 2004
WL 1922134, at *1, *4-5 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2004) (finding preempted a state law claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with contractual
relations, although "[n]either the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has directly addressed
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Not only is discharge motivated by a desire to preclude enjoyment or
receipt of benefits prototypical, but section 510 is the benchmark for "but-
for" types of proof. Whenever the employer can prove a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee, then even though
such termination may "'have an incidental, albeit important effect on an
employee's pension rights,"' the employee's claim must fail."' To accrue
liability, an employer must exhibit the specific intent to discriminate
because of the employee's need for ERISA rights and benefits.82 "'ERISA
does not guarantee every employee a job until he or she has fully vested
into a company's benefit plan.' Rather, ERISA guarantees that no
employee will be terminated where the purpose of the discharge is the
interference with one's pension rights.
83
Although few in number overall, the more common ERISA section 510
violations are proven by a single employee who lost his job.8 One of the
first courts to consider a retaliation claim awarded the plaintiff just the type
of relief Perry McClendon sought, but was denied, in state court.8
5
Preemption was not an issue. John Folz may have been the first plaintiff to
convince a federal court that he was discharged, shortly after he told his
boss he had incurable multiple sclerosis, because his employer intended to
interfere with his receipt of pension and medical plan benefits in violation
of section 510.86 Giving credence to his claims of pretense and suspect
timing, the court in Folz v. Marriott Corp.8 refused to accept the purported
whether a state law claim that, by its factual allegations falls within § 510 is completely
preempted"). Butsee Del Priore v. Citibank, No. 99-16174,2000 WL 1195472, at *2 (9th Cir.
Aug. 22, 2000) (holding that an employee's claim that she was discharged in retaliation for
filing an appeal for the company's denial of ERISA benefits, which "sound[ed] identical" to an
ERISA section 510 claim, was not preempted).
80. Alphonso v. AT&T Co., No. 90-4962, 1992 WL 189498, at *5 (E.D. La. July 24,1992)
(quoting Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1991)).
81. Id. at *6.
82. See, e.g., Conkwright, 933 F.2d at 238.
83. Id. (quoting Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988)).
84. Most claims fall under an individual employee's deprivation of health benefits. See,
e.g., Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that an employer
discharged an employee in retaliation for exercising disability benefits rights); Kross v. We.
Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1239, 1246 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that an employee presented a
cognizable section 510 claim when the employer reduced its workforce and employee lost his
medical and dental benefits); Vallone v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Nos. 02 Civ. 6064
(RCC), 02 Civ. 7102 (RCC), 2004 WL 2912887, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2004) (denying an
employer's motion to dismiss); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (holding an employer liable for intentional interference with an employee's benefits for
discharging him to avoid paying costly health benefits after the employee informed the
employer that he had multiple sclerosis).
85. See Folz, 594 F.Supp. at 1021.
86. See id. at 1010.
87. 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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legitimate business reasons offered by the company as a justification for
Folz's dismissal two months after the company learned of his illness."' This
dismissal followed sixteen years of consistently positive evaluations and the
recent laudatory industry review of the hotel Folz managed.89
Finding circumstantial evidence of the company's retaliation against its
former employee, the court did all it could to put him back in the place he
would have occupied were it not for his unlawful discharge.9 According to
the district court:
A careful review of the pertinent statutory language and
legislative history of ERISA, along with a comparison of ERISA
to similar remedial statutes, leads this Court to conclude that its
equitable power under ERISA is not limited to mere
reinstatement of pension plan benefits. Rather, the Court
concludes that it has the equitable power under ERISA to put the
plaintiff "back into the position he enjoyed before the discharge.
This includes awarding plaintiff back pay, reinstatement to his
former position, restitution of his forfeited employee's benefits,
and any other relief necessary to make him whole." 9'
Section 510 has daunted, and dashed, most plaintiffs. For instance, in
Kapetanovich v. Rockwell International, Inc.,92 a former employee alleged
that he was fired after eight years as an accountant because the company
wanted to avoid paying his medical bills, which in the years immediately
prior to his discharge had averaged $26,000 a year. 3 Kapetanovich also
claimed that the company had unduly delayed in paying his insurance
claims, that because of the delay he had been forced to wait almost a year
before getting an injection, which he was supposed to have monthly, and
that the company had limited him to four days of treatment at a diabetes
clinic, even though the average stay would have been two weeks.94 Plaintiff
did not make separate claims against the trustees for each matter; rather, he
used the facts as cumulative evidence of the company's alleged unlawful•96
motive. 95 The court granted the company's motion for summaryjudgment.
Conceding that a section 510 violation is rarely "'demonstrated by "smoking
88. Id. at 1014-15.
89. Id. at 1010-12.
90. See id. at 1015-16.
91. Id. at 1016 (quoting Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) ("construing ERISA")).
92. No. 92-3018, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 36785 (3d Cir. July 15, 1992).
93. Id. at *1-5.
94. Id. at *5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *13-14.
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gun" evidence,' ' '97 the court stated the majority rule among jurisdictions
accepting allegations based upon circumstantial evidence:
When a violation of Section 510 can only be proved by
circumstantial evidence, this circuit has used the scheme of
shifting burdens of proof developed by the United States Supreme
Court in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, and other
Title VII cases. To make out a prima facie case under section 510,
a plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
s/he "(1) belongs to the protected class, (2) was qualified for the
position involved, and (3) was discharged.., under circumstances
that provide some basis for believing that the prohibited intent
was present." If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case,
"the burden of production shifts to the employer to introduce
admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its challenged actions." If the employer carries its burden, "the
presumption drops from the case and the [plaintiff] is afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's articulated reason
is pretextual 'either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.
''98
Applying this proof scheme, the court accepted Kapetanovich's proof of
the first two elements, but found that he "failed to show that he was
discharged under circumstances that provide some basis for believing that
[defendant] Rockwell possessed the intent to violate ERISA."99 The court
found no proof of the requisite "causal connection" to prove the company's
specific intent because there was no proof that anyone with the authority to
fire the plaintiff knew how expensive his medical treatment was.'0° Simply
being aware of his absences would not suffice."' Moreover, the medical
claims were administered by an insurance company for Rockwell, which did
not make individual reports on the employee to the employer. 2 Finally,
the court thought it important that "the size of Kapetanovich's medical
97. Id. at *7 (quoting Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1987)).
98. Id. at *7-9 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (holding that it is within the discretion of the fact finder to
reject or accept the plaintiff's proffered reason for the alleged adverse employment action).
The seminal case for Title VII circumstantial evidence cases emerged from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A finding of liability against McDonnell
Douglas in that case should have prepared it for Millsap, since the same evidentiary burdens
were applied in the later case.
99. Kapetanovich, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 36785, at *9.
100. Id. at *9-10.
101. Id. at *10.
102. Id. at*10-11.
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benefits claims was insubstantial compared to Rockwell's total outlay in
medical claims payments in 1987. "13 News apparently travels slowly in
some multinational corporations.
In Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp.,'O the plaintiff was fired just shortly
before becoming vested in his company's pension plan.0 5 He made several
claims, but the alleged ERISA violation was dependent upon section 510.'06
Humphreys had worked at a number of management positions for a
subsidiary of North American Coal Corporation' °7 for almost ten years
when he was discharged. 8 Although Mr. Humphreys alleged that he had
been promised job security, when the mine was sold "North American
discharged Humphreys [who was forced to take] a job at a lower salary with
the purchaser of the mine."'09 The Sixth Circuit accepted the findings that
Humphreys met his burden of presenting evidence to support each
of the elements of a prima facie case. He was discharged, and it
was his testimony that his pension would have vested in two
months and that this would have cost the company a substantial
amount. Although it is no more than the bare minimum that a
plaintiff must show to meet the prima facie case threshold, in this
case it satisfies that low threshold because, examining only
Humphreys' evidence, the proximity to vesting provides at least
some inference of intentional, prohibited activity.1'
The court followed the lead of other circuits in analogizing to Title VII in
both description of the violation and requirements of proof: "[T]o avoid
summary judgment on a section [510] claim, a plaintiff must show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact that there was: '(1) prohibited
employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the
attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled."""
Once the employer offers a legitimate rationale for the discharge, the
103. Id. at *12.
104. 966 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 1043-44.
106. Id. at 1039.
107. The defendant Bellaire Corporation was called North American Coal Corporation
when the actions in this case took place. See id. at 1039 n.1.
108. Id. at 1039.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1044. The court cites Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405 (1 st Cir. 1992),
for the proposition that such coincidences might establish a case, but then cites Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988), where "the court stated that its previous
decisions 'cannot be read to mean that mere cost savings and proximity to benefits are
sufficient per se to create a genuine issue of material fact."' Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1043-44
(quoting Dister, 859 F.2d at 1117 n.1).




plaintiff must rebut with proof that such reason is pretextual."2 This is no
easy task.
In denying a company's motion for summary judgment on the section 510
claim of a longtime executive who was discharged, a district court in Blair v.
Young-Phillips Corp. " 3 explained:
In making the determination of whether the plaintiff has met his
burden of showing pretext, "[t]he question is not whether [the
defendants] exercised prudent business judgment,... but whether
[the plaintiff] has come forward to refute the articulated,
legitimate reasons for his discharge. In this regard, [the plaintiff]
must do more than challenge the judgment of his superiors
through his own self-interested assertions."'
4
This approach has been consistently followed over the last two decades
and continues to have currency." 5 For example, in Parker v. Union Planters
Corp.,116 the plaintiff, a former employee, filed an action claiming that his
employer fired him for the purpose of interfering with his attainment of
certain benefits under the employer's Supplementary Executive Retirement
Plan (SERP)Y7 Mr. Parker had been
employed by Defendant Union Planters Corporation for a total of
twenty-four years.... During the last ten years of his employment,
from March 1990 until March 2000, he served as Chief Financial
Officer ("CFO") of UPC. During Plaintiff's tenure as CFO of
UPC, the bank grew in size ... from approximately $4 billion in
assets to approximately $33 billion in assets. UPC also went from
being a financial institution that had lost approximately $22
million in the year before Plaintiff became CFO to a financial
112. Id.
113. 235 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
114. Id. at 473 (quoting Dale v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)); cf.
Rowe v. Marley Co., 233 F.3d 825,830-31 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment where
the plaintiff failed to "forecast any evidence that cast[] doubt on the veracity of [the
defendant's] proffered explanation" that the plaintiff was terminated as part of a company-
wide reduction in force); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231,239-40 (4th
Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff's only evidence of pretext was the
fact that his termination saved the defendant money).
115. See, e.g., Huske v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1222,1229-30 (D. Kan. 2004);
Blair v. Young Phillips Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 465,473 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)) (implementing Title VII prima facie case burden-
shifting).
116. 284 F. Supp. 2d 931 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
117. Id. at 932-33.
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institution that earned approximately $410 million in the last year
he was CFO."8
The company hired a new CFO, who promptly demoted Mr. Parker, and
with similar efficacy terminated his employment."9 After his involuntary
termination, the employee made a demand for payment of benefits under
the SERP, but the employer informed him that he was ineligible for benefits
120because he was terminated sixteen months prior to his fifty-fifth birthday.
The court found that the employee did "not establish[] the requisite causal
connection necessary for the prima facie case" because "[tihere [was] no
evidence that the SERP was a motivating factor or even a consideration in
the decision to fire [the employee].' 2' As the Third Circuit had concluded a
decade earlier in Kapetanovich, the court saw no proof that the company
knew what Mr. Parker stood to lose by being fired at precisely the time he
was. 2 2 "The fundamental problem with [the employee's] case [was] that he
[had no direct proof] that [the new CFO] was.., aware of [the employee's]
potential SERP benefits at the time [he made the discharge decision].'
23
Beyond the difficulty of proving employer interference, some courts have
tried to limit the claims to individuals, rather than large classes. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has oft-been
quoted for its reading of decisions by its sister circuit courts as "implicitly
recogniz[ing] that a corporate organizational change that results in the
termination of employees is really not a prototype of the sort of action that
§ 510 was primarily designed to cover.
1 24
118. Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 933-34, 936-37.
120. Id. at 938.
121. Id. at 940.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 939.
For example, Plaintiff argues that it is inconceivable that [the CFO] was unaware
of Plaintiff's SERP because he reviewed [financial and proxy statements] before he
interviewed for the CFO position. [The CFO] testified that he reviewed the
[information] but did not read or even print the exhibits, which included Plaintiff's
SERP agreement.
Id. at 940. Two other senior officers who had participated in hiring the new CFO, who also
had the SERP benefits, apparently did not participate in the decision to fire Mr. Parker. See
id. at 939.
According to Plaintiff's own testimony, when Mr. Rawlins informed Plaintiff
that he would be demoted, Mr. Rawlins told him "we've got to get the cost saves, we
have got to upgrade our accounting systems . . .we're going to improve our
budgeting system, we're going to improve our forecasting of earnings system and all
those kind of things."
Id. at 941 (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Record at 38-39).
124. Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The court claims that
motions for summary judgment in cases of individual section 510 claimants are harder to win
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Although the word "discharge" can have varying meanings-it is
sometimes used to refer to any employment termination including
a permanent layoff caused by impersonal factors-more often it is
used to refer to a personalized decision. In this case, it seems
rather clear to us that Congress was using the word "discharge" in
the latter sense-which means an employer's decision to sell or
close down an operation would not normally implicate § 510
merely because the action caused the termination of employees.
If Congress had wished for § 510 to apply routinely to such
decisions, which are virtually always based, at least in part, on




The goal of section 510 is eviscerated if the section is not applicable when
an employer closes a plant or division that contains its most senior
personnel. Although, read literally, the statute does limit protection to "a
participant or beneficiary.'12 An obvious employer defense to section 510 is
that plant closures fail to discriminate against employees' obtainment of
their pension rights because a plant closure impacts all employees equally,
regardless of pension benefits.
127
Not irrelevant is that the impetus for employee pension benefit protection
was the 1963 Studebaker plant closing that left thousands of automobile
workers without their promised retirement benefits. 2 " Considering the
extensive damage a plant closure can cause to workers' pension benefits,
Congress considered section 510 an integral part of ERISA's protections. 1
29
Despite this intended protection and congressional purpose for ERISA's
creation, section 510 has been but an ancillary section to ERISA. Since the
purpose of ERISA, particularly section 510, was to combat intentional
interference with an employee's retirement benefits resulting from a plant
than with class or group actions. See id. "While Ford realized significant pension savings-an
estimated $18.8 million," id. at 1334, the resulting loss to the employees was incidental, and
not motivating, id. at 1336.
125. Id. at 1337-38; see also Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12,
16 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that section 510 does not provide a remedy for an employee
injured by a defendant-employer who sold a plant, laid off its employees and terminated its
pension plan entirely with respect to those employees because employer's actions involved the
pension plan in general as opposed to specific individuals).
126. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (emphasis added).
127. See Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.
128. Muir, supra note 27, at 203-04.
129. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,143 (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, at
35-36 (1973) and H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973)) ("Congress viewed this section [510] as a
crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the
provision of promised benefits."); see also Muir, supra note 27, at 214.
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closing, it is not surprising that today section 510 is an important cause of
action to possibly hundreds of thousands of displaced workers.3
HISTORY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE PLANT CLOSING
CONTEXT
Proving that an employer had the intent to interfere with pension benefits
in a discriminatory manner is extremely difficult when the employer's
decision has affected hundreds, if not thousands, of employees equally,
regardless of pension benefit entitlements.... "ERISA, like the other
statutes regulating workplace conduct, is not to be used as a vehicle for
substituting another's business judgment .... [I]t is only where there is a
legally sufficient basis to find illegal discrimination that an employer's
business judgment must give way., 132 Initially, courts assumed that section
510's proscriptions applied only to individual plaintiffs, and, even then, only
when an employer interfered with vesting eligibility. Employees' use of
section 510 in plant closure situations or as a basis for a class action is fairly
infrequent, as many courts originally eschewed causes of action brought
pursuant to section 510, limiting the section's scope by a strict
interpretation.'3 West v. Butler135 involved a union's claim that section 510
130. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. NO. 989,
EXTENDED MASS LAYOFFS IN 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://stats.bls.gov/mls/mlsreport
989.pdf. A review of this report reveals the importance of section 510. According to the
Bureau's statistics, almost one million employees lost their jobs due to mass layoffs in 2004.
Id. In this same period, approximately 159,856 of those lost their jobs due to permanent
worksite closures. Id. Worksite closures represent an average of 15% of the mass layoffs in
2004. Id. However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics ceased reporting worksite closures
beginning in January 2004. Assuming the trend continues, of the 239,454 people who lost their
jobs in mass layoff actions in January alone, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Mass Layoffs in January 2004, at 1 (Feb. 25, 2004), http://stats.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/mmls_02252004.pdf, approximately 30,172 of those employees lost their
jobs due to permanent worksite closures.
131. Employers typically counter that discriminatory intent is impossible in plant closure
situations when all employees lose their job as the result of a plant closure. See, e.g., Pickering
v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1548 (D. Utah 1992).
132. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1299 (N.D. Okla. 2001),
rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
133. See, e.g., Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1984).
134. See Moehle v. NL Indus., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 769,779 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1986), affd, 845
F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988). In Moehle, the Eastern District of Missouri reiterated Aronson,
finding that "§ 1140 [ERISA § 510] only prohibits actions aimed at individuals" after the
company had ceased its operations at its St. Louis plant shortly before the plaintiffs were to
receive additional accrual on their pension benefits and abruptly dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint that the plant closure was violative of ERISA as the employer's had a legitimate
business justification to close the plant. Moehle, 646 F. Supp. at 779 n.6, 780. Similarly, in
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applied when secondary picketing allegedly caused the employer to
decrease its contribution to the employees' pension plan. 36 While finding
such a factual context inapt for ERISA's 510 provision, the court also
explained, albeit in dicta, that vested benefits were already protected,
making section 510 irrelevant.1 7  The court quoted one of ERISA's
sponsors for evidence of the sagacity of its conclusion:
"Every employee is to have the right, enforceable by the
Secretary of Labor, to be free from interference with his pension
benefits. This means that he cannot be discharged, fined,
suspended, expelled or otherwise interfered with in order to
prevent him from receiving pension benefits or attaining eligibility
for pension benefits. There are stiff criminal penalties if this type
of interference takes the form of force, fraud or violence or threats
of this nature.
'' 38
Later courts followed suit in limiting section 510 claims to workers whose
discharge prevented their benefits from vesting, and also denying the claims
of interference with benefits that were incapable of vesting, like health
insurance benefits,3 3 although the circuits were not unanimous.'
4°
The Supreme Court addressed the split among the circuits in Inter-Modal
Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF),
deciding that § 510 prohibited employer interference with either kind of
benefit. A subcontract was transferred from a company subsidiary to astranger corporation, and all employees within the large bargaining unit
West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit determined that "the section is
aimed solely at protecting individual rights." Id. at 246.
135. 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 241-42.
137. See id. at 245-46.
138. Id. at 243-44 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,935 (1974) (statement
of Sen. Javits)).
139. See, e.g., Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 80 F.3d 348,351 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that ERISA provides protection only to those
employees who have not yet vested with the reasoning that a vested employee is already
protected, and ERISA provides no protection for any further accrual of pension benefits),
vacated, 520 U.S. 510 (1997).
140. See, e.g., Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404,1411-12 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
section 510 draws no distinction between benefits that vest and those that do not); Heath v.
Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256,258 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332,
1336 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (implying the same); Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543,546
(11th Cir. 1993) (same); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991)
(implying the same); Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp 899, 907 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
("Class-based discrimination, whether based on race, sex, or under ERISA, pension rights, is
every bit as illegal as individualized discrimination.").
141. 520 U.S. 510 (1997).
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were told to accept work with the new subcontractor or be fired. 42 The
ERISA benefits, both vested and contingent, provided by the new
subcontractor were far inferior to those of ATSF.143 The plaintiffs sued,
claiming that ATSF had discharged them for the purpose of interfering with
their benefits. ' 4 The district court dismissed their claims, rejecting the
argument that the discharge violated section 510 by interfering with the
employees' ability to assert claims for benefits. 145 The appellate court
upheld the plaintiffs' claims for pension benefits but dismissed their claims
for welfare benefits since welfare benefits do not technically vest under
ERISA.' 46 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "Congress' use of the
word 'plan' in § 510 all but forecloses the argument that § 510's interference
clause applies only to 'vested' rights.' '147 Justice O'Connor, while not
explicitly stating what constitutes protected rights under section 510,
affirmed: "[Section] 510 draws no distinction between those rights that 'vest'
under ERISA and those that do not.""8 Although non-vested benefits, like
health insurance, can be legally amended or even ended, the sponsor must
follow ERISA procedure. 49 Simply firing, transferring, or, as the Court
said, amending one participant's plan at a time, violates section 510.150
[I]n the case where an employer acts with a purpose that triggers
the protection of § 510, any tension that might exist between an
employer's power to amend the plan and a participant's rights
under § 510 is the product of a careful balance of competing
interests, and is most surely not the type of "absurd or glaringly
unjust" result ... that would warrant departure from the plain
language of § 510. '5
The Court was not asked to consider whether employees can seek section
510 protection against discharges that prevent them from further accrual of
already-vested pension benefits. Because ATSF only involved health
insurance, it does not mandate summary judgment on the basis of plaintiffs'
post-vested status.'52 The Millsap Court was sympathetic to the employees
142. Id. at 512.
143. Id. at 512-13.
144. Id. at 513.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 513-14.
147. Id. at 514-15. Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court, stated:
"Had Congress intended to confine § 510's protection to 'vested' rights, it could have easily
substituted the term 'pension plan' for 'plan,' or the term 'nonforfeitable' right for 'any right.'
Id. at 515 (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 515-16.
150. Id. at 516.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. See id. at 516-17.
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who lost the chance to continue to accrue benefits they would have enjoyed
were their plants not closed, and rightfully denied the company's motion to
dismiss.
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. 53 set the standard for prospective
injunctive relief for class action suits under section 510, taking guidance
again from Title VII.54 First, "[tjhe class representative 'must establish that
discrimination was the employer's standard practice."1 55 In a second,
remedial phase, the consequences of the employer's discrimination then
determines each individual class member's entitlement to relief. 56 For class
members to receive money damages, the plaintiff must prove, under the
determinative factor test, that the employer had the intent to, and actually
did, interfere with the employees' pension rights."' Employees who have
been discharged as a result of a plant closure must prove that their
employer was driven by the specific intent to interfere with their receipt of
pension benefits and not just because the employer stood to benefit
economically. 11 Courts will not accept an employer's defense that pension
costs were simply too expensive to sustain, holding that such an action still
constitutes interference with pension benefits under section 510,'5' but
consideration of those costs must be shown to be a motivating factor.
Plant closures inevitably will involve mixed motive problems consisting of
both the employer's permissible motives, for example, a decline in business,
and impermissible motivations, discharging an employee nearing pension
benefit accrual. To determine which motive predominated, courts
153. 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987).
154. See id. at 852.
155. Id. (quoting Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1004 (3d Cir. 1984)). "If the class
establishes a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to introduce admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its challenged actions." Id. at 853.
156. McClendon v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1553, 1556 (D.N.J. 1987).
157. Id. at 1177.
158. See, e.g., Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1984) (dismissing a strict interpretation of section 510, which would make any plant closure,
mass layoff, merger, downsizing, or termination illegal, and implying that courts require a
demonstration of intent to defeat an employee's pension rights).
159. See, e.g., Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 905 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(rejecting a pension cost defense by stating that "ERISA was intended to prevent employers
from making employment decisions based upon their desire to avoid pension liability. ...
Allowing an employer to defend an ERISA claim solely on the ground that its pension
program was too expensive to maintain would defeat the purpose of § 510, which is to prohibit
employers from making employment decisions based upon pension costs.").
160. See id. at 909 (noting that, in employer's defense, "[t]he defendant's documentary
evidence also shows that pension costs were not singled out, in the final analysis, as one of the
factors requiring the closing of Benton Harbor. The plant capacity study, in all its various
drafts, does not even contain a separate line item for pension costs.").
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eventually adopted the employment discrimination analysis from Title VII
cases.' Although some courts, earlier in ERISA's history, decided that the
mixed-motive and burden-shifting inherent in the civil rights cases was
pertinent only where a single plaintiff alleged a section 510 violation, '62 the
analogue to the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) became apparent; especially
since in most mass 510 actions, the employer's interference is based upon
the workers' age, years of service, and a heightened accrued benefit for
pension purposes.
Before the 2001 Millsap decision, there were few plaintiffs alleging that
plant closures or relocated operations were section 510 violations affecting a
group of employees. 63 The proof is difficult to make, and perhaps even
more trying to comprehend. As one court tried to untangle the complex of
proofs and defenses associated with the beginning of the demise of the
United States Steel Corporation (later called USX), it noted:
This case concerns the bureaucratic decision-making process of
USX, a large and powerful steel company, its motivations for
making decisions, and the consequences in the lives of those
people affected by USX's decisions....
This case is also about creative accounting practices, leveraged
negotiations on a national level, a torn union, and a vulnerable
work force on the local level; negotiations that pitted the desires
of a small, ageing community of workers and their need for
continued employment and assured retirement benefits, and the
efforts of USX to minimize future costs and thus to avoid, if
possible, the accumulation of long term benefit liabilities.
64
Although most corporate reorganizations result in termination of
employees, courts have denied companies' motions to dismiss claims arising
out of the "sale or closure of an entire unit [whenever] the plaintiffs [have a
colorable claim] that some ERISA-related characteristic special to the unit
(such as its having clearly above-average proportion of employees with
161. See, e.g., Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834,852 (3d Cir. 1987); Nemeth, 677 F.
Supp. at 903.
162. See, e.g., Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.
163. See, e.g., Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 840, 854, 856 (concluding that the existence of a
computer tracking program that red-flagged senior employees with higher pension benefits
and the employer's systematic layoff of these red-flagged employees was done purposely to
lower pension liability); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1550 (D. Utah 1992)
(finding employer's idling and eventual closing of plant done to prevent employees from
obtaining additional pension benefits to be a section 510 violation). But see Nemeth, 677 F.
Supp. at 905,910 (finding that transferring work to a younger, non-union plant was not enough
to prove that the employer acted to prevent older Benton Harbor employees from obtaining
their full pension benefits).
164. Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1569-70.
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pension rights about to vest) was essential to the firm's selecting that unit
for closure or sale."' 65 A plaintiff's claim under ERISA section 510 must
demonstrate specific intent by the employer to interfere with an employee's
benefits, but evidence that the entrepreneurial change would have taken
place, even where the firm had neither actual knowledge of nor intent to
interfere with specific benefits, usually justifies such managerial
prerogatives.
66
In Nemeth v. Clark Equipment Co. , 167 the court required the plaintiff to
show that the employer's "motivating factor" behind terminating its
employees was to interfere with their attainment of benefits. '6 The
employees claimed that Clark Equipment purposely interfered with their
attainment of more lucrative pension benefits under the "30 and out" or "85
point" benefit plan, special pension subsidies that allowed laid-off
employees who had accrued sufficient tenure or a combination of age and
time-in-service to receive the same pensions they would have had they
worked longer. The court rejected Nemeth's claim and held that the
employer met its burden of showing that it had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason since it considered only "the bottom line" of
sales, assets, and pre-tax income, and not solely on pension costs.'
70
165. Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
166. See, e.g., Rush v. United Techs., 930 F.2d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Dister v.
Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988)); May v. Shuttle, Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-
1019 (NHJ), 1996 WL 774536, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 5,1996), affd, No. 96-7233,1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 37561 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1997). The court in May explained:
Because plaintiffs were furloughed as part of a reduction in force, and the entire
fleet service group was eliminated and replaced with an outside contractor, the
Court considers their furloughs to be a "corporate organizational change."
Accordingly, plaintiffs must show specific evidence of unlawful motivation in order
to avoid having summary judgment entered against them.
Id. at *3. The court further held that:
The problems that Shuttle was facing were much larger than plaintiffs' pension
costs-for example, the fact that Shuttle lost over $66 million in 1989 and still had
tremendous debts to repay. Although the fleet service workers were an "aging"
group of employees and Hallcom was concerned about the cost of the contributions
that Shuttle was making to their pensions, such evidence is not enough to show a
specific discriminatory intent.
Id. at *5.
167. 677 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
168. Id. at 906 (quoting Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315,
1319 (N.D. Cal. 1984)). "If Clark had made the decision based primarily on the costs of the
pension plan, Clark would have acted with the purpose of interfering with plaintiffs' rights
under the plan." Id. However, a mere demonstration by the plaintiff that the employer
received a financial gain by the plant closure will not suffice; a direct causal link must be
shown. Id.
169. Id. at 902-03.
170. Id. at 905.
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Despite a finding that the evidence was "sufficient to make out a prima
facie case of pension discrimination in violation of section 510 of ERISA,"
and that the employer took into consideration the significant pension
expenses at the closed plant, the plaintiffs could not rebut the employer's
legitimate business reason for closing the plant -slow work and the need to
save costs across-the-board.171 The district court was convinced that the
employer "would have made the decision to close [the local plant] even if it
had ignored the cost of the pension plan altogether."'' 2 Although the
evidence showed about a forty percent difference in labor costs between a
closed Benton Harbor, Michigan, plant and work transferred to an
Asheville, North Carolina, plant, 17 3 the court found that "[a]t most, pension
costs amounted to 20% of the total difference in cost between the two
plants," and ruled for the company. 17 4 The court endorsed and believed the
company's
claims that it based its decision on a number of economic
considerations, and that no one item of cost was singled out as the
cost responsible for Benton Harbor's closure [even though it
expressed some skepticism at Clark's argument] that it considered
only "the bottom line," an elusive accounting concept which
defied definition by any witness. 175
In Nemeth, the plaintiffs used comparison data of pension liabilities
between the closed facility and the new facility to which the work was
transferred.176  In a similar fashion, other complainants have utilized
statistical data demonstrating the number of older employees, employees
with more years of service, or facilities with more costly collective
171. Id. at 904-05.
172. Id. at 909.
The world-wide recession of the late 1970s and competition from foreign
manufacturers had resulted in a drop in sales of nearly 41% between 1979 and 1982.
Clark reported losses of $234 million in 1982. Reinhart determined that Clark
might go bankrupt by the end of 1982 unless the company took drastic steps to
reduce its production capacity and overhead costs.
Id. at 902 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 909.
174. Id. at 909-10. The union Benton Harbor plant plaintiffs, of which there were
eighteen, had an average age of 51.9 years with an average of 25.4 years of service with Clark.
Id. at 902. The Asheville plant had considerably younger, non-union employees who all had
less than five years service. Id. Clark contended that a drop in sales and declining economy
forced them to seek cheaper labor and that pension costs were only incidental to their
decision. Id. Interestingly, Benton Harbor employees who requested a transfer to Asheville
so that they could meet the additional accrual requirements under the thirty years service of
the eighty-five point system were denied by Clark. Id. at 903-05.
175. Id. at 905.
176. Id. at 903-04.
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bargaining agreements. In Gavalik v. Continental Can Co.,' the court
utilized the "determinative factor" test to assess whether there existed a
nexus between the employer's conduct of closing its plant and its
discriminatory intent to defeat its employee's pension rights.'78 Some courts
have stated that the plaintiffs need not show that avoidance of pension
liability was the sole reason for the plant closure. 79 Nevertheless, a plaintiff
may fail to meet his burden of proof for showing intentional interference
with pension rights if the loss of benefits was a "'mere consequence of, but
not a motivating factor behind, a termination of employment."" 8  The
plaintiffs must prove intent by the employer to defeat the employees'
attainment of pension benefits through direct evidence of discriminatory
intent or, alternatively, by Title VII burden-shifting standards that are used
when only circumstantial evidence is available.'8'
The Gavalik court applied the Title VII analysis, in a slightly modified
form, for the Continental Can Company's steel can plant closure."' The
divested employee/plaintiff's case must show: "(1) prohibited employer
conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of
any right to which the employee may become entitled."'8 3 The employer
must then prove "'that it would have reached the same conclusion or
engaged in the same conduct in any event, i.e., in the absence of the
impermissible consideration.'' The burden then shifts back to the
employee to show that the employer's "justification [was] pretext, or that




In Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., employees failed in their suit against
Levi Strauss when the employer decided to close its more costly San
177. 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987).
178. Id. at 860. The court stated that while an incidental loss of an employee's pension
benefits resulting from a legitimate business decision is not a section 510 infringement, nor is
bad faith an element of a section 510 claim, concern over the company's economic situation
does not justify employee termination to cut pension liabilities. Id. at 857 n.39.
179. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992).
180. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(quoting Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
181. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 859-60 (quoting Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d
175, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)).
182. See id. at 852.
183. Id. Although Gavalik set out the burden-shifting test, Continental operated a nation-
wide system to find the most senior employees that would save the company the greatest
amount in pension liability. Id. at 854. The judge declared that "if Continental's liability
avoidance scheme does not constitute direct proof of discrimination under § 510, we are hard
pressed to imagine a set of facts that would." Id. at 856.
184. Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (quoting
Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 863).
185. Id. (citing Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853).
186. 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Antonio plant instead of cutting production at a Caribbean plant when
demand dropped for its product."7
[T]he Plaintiffs pointed to: (1) evidence that the San Antonio
plant was closed to "cut costs"; (2) evidence that Levi Strauss
decided to close its San Antonio plant rather than cutting back its
Program 807 operations in the Caribbean, a labor market where
the company did not incur pension and benefit expenses; (3)
evidence that, at the time the San Antonio plant was closed,
management was aware that benefit and pension costs were rising
steeply on a company-wide basis; and (4) evidence suggesting that
the plant closure prevented 369 employees at the San Antonio
plant with less than five years of service from becoming "fully
vested."'
The court accepted the company's defense of company-wide cost-cutting,
and found that five years was hardly suspect timing."9
In Pickering v. USX Corp.,'9° former employees used circumstantial
evidence to prove that USX did seek to avoid long-term pension liability by
idling and then closing its Geneva plant, and by its decision to outsource
and pay overtime to replacement workers hired during a strike instead of
recalling laid-off senior employees.' 9' USX articulated three legitimate,
nondiscriminatory business reasons for its decision to close the plant. 92
First, the company contended that it was simply seeking to be more
profitable.' 9' Second, the company asserted that a "Facility
Rationalization" study recommended the closing of the particular plant in
question in order to obtain specific profit goals.' 94 To achieve its objective,
the firm was forced to transfer work to another plant which could be
operated with fewer costs.' 95 By obviating the vesting of the laid-off, then
discharged employees, the company saved over fifty million dollars.'
96
The district court accepted USX's reasons for closing the Geneva plant as
legitimate, but held them to be pretextual based on the evidence presented,
finding that USX's series of pension benefit cost studies were the motivating
187. Id. at 973, 980. The company successfully presented evidence that its decision was
made "without regard to costs associated with pension.., or other employee benefits." Id. at
980 (quoting Peter Thigpen, Levi Strauss representative).
188. Id. at 980 (footnote omitted).
189. Id. at 980-81.
190. 809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992).
191. Id. at 1539.




196. Id. at 1546.
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factor for closing the Geneva plant. 197 USX steel manufacturing was held to
be liable under section 510 when nearly 1900 of its laid-off workers brought
suit because its employer idled the Geneva plant before permanently
closing it.' s USX had incurred significant additional overtime wage costs at
other facilities in order to prevent the laid-off plaintiffs from reaching their
"magic number" benefits (i.e., a combination of age and years and service)
and avoid the substantially increased pension benefits the company would
incur if the plaintiffs worked for USX until 1989.29 The district court held
that "'ERISA does not distinguish between the termination of one
employee and the termination of 100 employees. Either action is illegal if
taken with the purpose of avoiding pension liability."' 2°
The best example of a nearly-successful section 510 claim arising out of a
plant closure came with the flood of litigation from the Continental Can
Company's (Continental) self-proclaimed "liability avoidance program,"
adopted in the late 1970s.2 0 1 In a real Ford Pinto-type direct evidence case,
the employees of Continental proved the existence of the company's secret
computer program designed to cut pension liability costs. 202 It was termed
"Bell," the clever reverse acronym for "'Lowest Level of Employee
Benefits' or 'Let's Limit Employee Benefits.' 23 As in earlier plant closing
cases, the employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement
which promised that Continental would provide additional, so-called• 204
"Magic Number" pension benefits to any employee laid off prematurely;
these supplemental benefits were not to be paid out of the pension fund, but
out of ordinary revenues. When Continental faced a severe decline in
197. Id. at 1548-49, 1552. The court also considered this evidence in light of the
circumstantial evidence that by idling the plant, "USX could save in excess of $50 million if the
closure of Geneva was accelerated and the employees were terminated prior to 1989." Id. at
1549.
198. Id. at 1511, 1550.
199. Id. at 1516-17, 1549.
200. Id. at 1548 (quoting Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899,907 (W.D. Mich.
1987)) (failing to even consider whether additional accrual was protected as a right under
ERISA section 510).
201. See, e.g., Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1987); McLendon v.
Cont'l Group, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 908 F.2d 1171 (3d. Cir. 1990);
McLendon v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1553 (D.N.J. 1987).
202. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 840-41,854; McLendon, 749 F. Supp. at 583,589; McLendon,
660 F. Supp. at 1555, 1557-58.
203. McLendon, 749 F. Supp. at 589.
204. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 838; McLendon, 749 F. Supp. at 587; McLendon, 660 F. Supp.
at 1555.
205. E.g., McLendon, 660 F. Supp. at 1555. Many union contracts, especially those
negotiated by the United Steelworkers decades earlier, contained supplemental pension
promises, since employers were unprepared for much-later business declines. See, e.g.,
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business as a result of the boom in the use of aluminum cans in the 1970s,2 6
Continental sought ways to reduce extra pension costs, especially since the1 07
corporation could access the money used to fund those plans. The Bell
computer tracking system identified workers by their age and years of
service and those workers were laid off just prior to the time when they
would become eligible for benefits.20 8 The Third Circuit found in Gavalik
that "if Continental's liability avoidance scheme does not constitute direct
proof of discrimination under § 510, we are hard pressed to imagine a set of
facts that would."20 9 The burden was placed on the plaintiff to prove that
"'but for' the impermissible consideration appellants would not have lost
work."21 Continental was then allowed to assert its so-called "same loss
defense," meaning, essentially, that the employees "would have suffered the
same loss of work even in the absence of the illegal plan. 2 1 Even with such
glaring evidence of allegedly unlawful motivation, Continental's liability
avoidance program (LAP) could not be separated from its other legitimate
business reasons to close their St. Louis plant, although Continental was
enjoined from further use of the LAP.2 2
A CLOSER LOOK AT MILLSAP v. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
CORP.
The Millsap lawsuit arose out of McDonnell Douglas's aircraft
manufacturing operations in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 2 McDonnell Douglas
began to struggle in the late 1980s as the government slashed its defense
contracts and, without these contracts, production declined.2 1 4 At the time,
Cement Divs., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 135,793 F.2d 759,761-
62 (6th Cir. 1986).
206. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 840.
207. E.g., id. at 840 & n.11.
208. McLendon v. Cont'l Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1175 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1990).
209. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 856. The district court in McLendon found:
The plan was shrouded in secrecy and executed company-wide at the specific
direction of the highest levels of corporate management. It was intended to save
hundreds of millions of dollars in unfunded pension liabilities. The evidence of the
plan, its secrecy, and its execution comes from the files of the defendants themselves.
The documents are more than a smoking gun; they are a fusillade.
McLendon, 749 F. Supp. at 583.
210. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 859; see also McLendon, 908 F.2d at 1178 ("'[B]ut for' the
discriminatory purpose, he or she would not have lost work.").
211. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 866.
212. See id. at 857, 865; McLendon, 908 F.2d at 1174, 1180, 1182-83.
213. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2001).
The Tulsa plant was used primarily to fulfill government defense contracts, particularly its
fighter aircraft, the F-15 Strike Eagle. Id. at 1264.
214. Id. In a company-wide memo, Chairman John McDonnell announced "The Hard
Reality," that company expenditures must be reduced by $700 million a year. Id.
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it was known that the company's pension plans were substantially over-
funded, creating tremendous amounts of potential capital for the
215
company -especially if the employees on whose behalf the plans were so
funded would cease accruing more benefits, or, indeed, become ineligiblefor aximm •216
for maximum vesting. Actuaries subsequently informed McDonnell
Douglas that the company could improve its financial situation if the
company would terminate its greatest pension liability, the older and most
senior employees.27 Following the Gulf War and the apparent successful
alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government
attempted to place a nine billion dollar order for seventy-two F-15s in
1991.218 McDonnell Douglas began an intense public campaign to win both
congressional and presidential approval of the contract, asserting that the
contract would save 7000 McDonnell Douglas jobs, thirty-three thousand
subcontractor positions, and would help ensure that the Tulsa plant would
remain open an additional three to five years. Despite the possible
security risks, and in light of the recessionary economy, the government
acceded to McDonnell Douglas's pressure, and President Bush announced
220
the approval of the nine billion dollar contract on September 11, 1992.
In a company-wide survey on how to reduce costs, the "Project M" study
221
recommended the closing of the Tulsa plant as early as August 1993.
Throughout the company's waves of layoffs from 1990 to 1994, McDonnell
Douglas monitored the savings from the pension fund and were able to
222track the age or length of service of each laid-off employee. These so-
called "curtailment gains," savings reflected on financial statements, could
be maximized if specifically applied to the company's "demographic
profile" of senior employees. 223 The Tulsa plant was found to fit the
215. Id. at 1268-69.
216. See id. at 1269-70.
217. See id. at 1268.
218. Seeid. at 1264.
219. See id. at 1265, 1275.
220. See id. at 1266.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 1268.
223. Id. at 1269-70. David Strom, an outside actuary with Alexander & Alexander, was
given headcount information by Richard Smoski, McDonnell Douglas's director of pensions,
savings, and payroll. Id. at 1269. Strom, in a memo to Smoski, estimated $57 million dollars in
savings with 20,000 layoffs, but as much as $125 million dollars in pension savings if
McDonnell Douglas laid off 20,000 of its "demographic profile" employees. Id. at 1269-70.
This was based on an across the company average of a 40.3 year old employee and 10.07 years
of service. Id. at 1270. Accordingly, "[ilf an older population with greater service was
terminated, the pension gain would be greater." Id. The use of outside actuaries does not fall
within the attorney-client privilege. Since McDonnell Douglas failed to cooperate with
discovery, the Millsap plaintiffs largely relied on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1287, 1309.
The use of the actuary's advice and consultations with McDonnell Douglas helped the
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demographic profile with the oldest and most senior employees at any of
McDonnell Douglas's plants.114 The plaintiffs found evidence that the
company specifically targeted the worksite of its highest number of
employees in the fifty to fifty-four year old age range.225 Under a company
plan, an employee had to reach age fifty-five to become eligible for an
226,enhanced pension. After discovering the potential savings in closing the
Tulsa plant, the company then looked to "monetize" the new-found pension
savings to pay for retiree health benefits, rather than finance them with
corporate assets, and thereby increase the corporate cash flow. 227 Such a
move would reflect positively on the company's financial statements to its
shareholders and, eventually, to Boeing, who would acquire McDonnell
Douglas in 1996.228
On December 3, 1993, the company announced the closing of the Tulsa
plant, despite its very public promises for continued operations after the
plaintiffs' case tremendously and has implications for other employers who close a plant and
face section 510 liability. Employers will have to ensure any outside consultations will not
take into account pension benefits, to the extent it may be a "motivating factor." See id. at
1300. Smoski admitted to "what if" scenarios concerning cutting pension costs in his talks with
the actuaries. Id. at 1269.
224. Id. The table below is reprinted from the court's findings of fact:
McDonnell Douglas Average Age and Seniority by Facility
1993
Hourly Employees Salaried Employees
Average Average
Average Years of Average Years of
Facility Ag Service Ape Service
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tulsa 50.95 19.68 49.27 18.74
Torrence 50.02 22.65 46.88 17.68
St. Louis 46.44 19.70 42.24 15.06
Columbus 46.32 4.89 44.02 6.51
St. Charles 45.58 16.04 44.06 15.86
Mesa 44.55 6.55 43.85 9.95
Titusville 43.52 10.11 44.71 12.70
Id.
225. Id. at 1270-71.
226. Id. at 1271. These employees would cost McDonnell Douglas an estimated $79,000 to
$86,000 each if given early retirement before reaching age fifty-five. Id. McDonnell Douglas
would save this amount if the employees were no longer at McDonnell Douglas before age
fifty-five. Id. Taking into account that the Tulsa plant had 300 employees in the fifty to fifty-
four year age range, this would amount to $18 million in cut pension liabilities. Id.
Furthermore, McDonnell Douglas stood to save nearly $7 million in medical benefits if it laid
off its employees before they reached age fifty-five. Id. Ernst & Young calculated this as an
"actuarial asset value" of $33,199,000 as of November 11, 1994. Id. at 1274.
227. Id. at 1271-72.
228. Id. at 1269, 1273.
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Saudi F-15 contract was granted. 229 The plaintiffs, James R. Millsap and his
co-workers, were all vested employees in one of the two retirement plans at
the Tulsa plant, and upon its closure, brought a class-action suit under
ERISA section 510.230
A. Procedural History-District Court
The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial, in which the liability and damage
phases of the suit were separated. In October 1997, the defendants moved
for summary judgment on two bases: (1) plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence
to meet a prima facie case of intentional interference under section 510 and
(2) the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by the language of ERISA
section 510, as they were already vested in their pension benefits at the time
of their termination. 232 Relying on Inter-Modal, Judge Holmes denied
McDonnell Douglas's motion, concluding that vested employees are not
barred under section 510.233 He also buttressed his decision by following the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Garratt v. Walker,23 where the court held that
section 510's protection was not limited to vested employees, but also
extended section 510's protections to those "rights ... not yet earned., 235
Judge Holmes concluded that the Tenth Circuit must ostensibly extend
section 510 to protect those employees who had vested prior to their
termination and had not yet reached the maximum amount of accrual.236
After a 1999 trial, the court found that, based on the plaintiffs' evidence
of balance sheets, outside actuary consultations by McDonnell Douglas, and
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's enormous savings by terminating
senior employees before their upcoming fifty-fifth birthdays, McDonnell
Douglas intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' pension rights. 37
Although McDonnell Douglas had presented its own legitimate,
nondiscriminatory business reasons of excess capacity and other financial
and economic considerations, the court rejected them as pretextual because
of the actuary's admission of its patent pension benefit costs analysis and
because of the circumstantial evidence that the eleven hundred senior Tulsa
229. Id. at 1263-64.
230. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-C-633-H, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23285,
at *2 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 1997).
231. See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2002).
232. Millsap, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23285, at *2.
233. See id. at *6-7.
234. 121 F.3d 565 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated in part, 164 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
235. Millsap, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23285, at *9 (citing Garratt, 121 F.3d at 570).
236. Id.
237. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268-71, 1300-01 (N.D.
Okla. 2001), rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
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employees stood to accrue additional amounts of benefits within the next
231
few years when they reached age fifty-five.
Ultimately, the company's credibility gap and "[r]ecord of [c]orporate
[d]ishonesty" prevented McDonnell Douglas from asserting its legitimate
business reason defense simply because it lacked the evidentiary proof that
there was, in fact, a legitimate reason.23 9 The court ultimately found in favor
of the employees, reflecting upon testimony from the manager of the closed
plant that even he had been misled, that the defendant's pattern of
discovery responses was obfuscatory, that the company "never considered
for a moment what commitments" it had made to the community or to
public officials, and drawing permissible inferences of "dishonesty about a
material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt.' 2 4 The court wrote: "'[O]nce
the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be
the most likely explanation, especially since the employer is in the best
position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.' 2 41 Writing for the
court, Judge Holmes put it succinctly, stating: "[McDonnell Douglas
Corporation] wanted to preserve the pension surplus from a plant closing
for itself," and thus held McDonnell Douglas to be liable under section
510.242
238. See id. at 1268-71, 1275, 1300-01. McDonnell Douglas asserted both financial and
political reasons as legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for closing the Tulsa plant. Id. at
1275-76. McDonnell Douglas had closed three plants prior to the Tulsa plant closing. Id. at
1275. The Mesa, Arizona plant could not be closed as McDonnell Douglas had recently spent
over $100 million in updating that plant and it was considered integral to the company's
helicopter operations. Id. at 1267. The Titusville, Florida plant, McDonnell Douglas asserted,
could not be closed because the company had bid to be the sole supplier of Tomahawk cruise
missiles and Titusville was the only plant that could handle fulfillment of the contract. See id.
McDonnell Douglas also claimed it could not close the St. Louis facility as it was too large to
merge into the Tulsa operations, housed McDonnell Douglas's engineering and technical
departments, remained the point of delivery for their products, and was the corporate
headquarters. Id. Another consideration was the fact that the Tulsa plant played a small part
in operations, as it assembled only the tail section of the F-15s. See id. at 1264. Lastly, the
Tulsa plant was leased to McDonnell Douglas from the Air Force and subsequently would
have been leased to McDonnell Douglas by the city itself. Id. at 1275, 1287. As a result,
McDonnell Douglas asserted that pension benefits played no part in its ultimate decision and
were left with no choice but to close the Tulsa facility due to excess capacity. Id. at 1275.
239. Id. at 1275. Judge Holmes also referred to McDonnell Douglas's maneuvering as a
"corporate culture of mendacity." Id. at 1301.
240. Id. at 1300-02.
241. Id. at 1306 (quoting Reeves v. Sandersen Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,147-48
(2000)).
242. Id. at 1307. The defendants not only failed to cooperate in providing discovery, but
possibly destroyed evidence after having notice of the impending lawsuit since June of 1994.
Id. at 1308-09. Judge Holmes also found "that Plaintiffs' case was materially prejudiced" by
the defense's spoliation of discovery documents and as a consequence "MDC [had]
demonstrated its culpability" by its actions. Id.
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B. District Court's Consideration of Equitable Relief and Backpay
Precedent
McDonnell Douglas sought to exclude the plaintiffs' request for backpay
under ERISA in a motion for summary judgment in June 2002.243 Under
ERISA section 532, the civil enforcement provision of Title I of ERISA, a
participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action, "(3)(A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan."2"
McDonnell Douglas, in arguing against an award of backpay, asserted
that Supreme Court precedent precluded prior backpay as equitable
relief.2 45  At a minimum, the company argued that Supreme Court
limitations on equitable relief in other, though disparate, cases instruct that
Congress intended restitution to be equitable in Title VII cases only, and
even then only if a court awards other equitable relief.246 Applying the
voluminous but seemingly conflicting case law regarding the archaic
difference between law and equity courts on relief, trust law, Title Vii, and
ERISA, Judge Holmes concluded that the plaintiffs' claim for backpay was
appropriate statutory relief.2 47 The court correctly recognized that the
Millsap plaintiffs did not seek to impose liability on McDonnell Douglas
under a contractual obligation. 24" As Judge Holmes indicated, ERISA
section 510 cases are statutory and lack any basis in contract law. 249 The
court further recognized that the plaintiffs sought only to be restored to the
"status quo ante," to the position plaintiffs would have occupied had
McDonnell Douglas not wrongfully closed its Tulsa plant.5 ° Consequently,
Judge Holmes found that "back pay, as a remedy for an ERISA § 510
243. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2002).
244. ERISA § 532(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
245. Millsap, 2002 WL 31386076, at *2.
246. Id. at *4 (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,218 n.4
(2002)).
247. See id. at *2-5.
248. Id. at *4.
249. Id. (citing Held v. Mfr. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir.
1990)).
250. See id. (citing Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d
1463, 1473 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[S]tating that the 'purpose of a back pay award is to make the
employee whole - i.e., restore the economic status quo that would have been obtained but for
the wrongdoing."').
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violation, constitutes equitable restitution and therefore 'equitable relief'
under section 502(a)(3). 251
Interpreting the Supreme Court's rationale in Title VII cases, Judge
Holmes asserted: "'[G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay
should be denied only for reasons which ... would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination ... and making persons
whole."'25 2 While the Title VII equitable injunctive relief of reinstatement
may not be available under the Millsap scenario, Judge Holmes concluded
that the impossibility of reinstatement due to plant closure in no way
precludes a plaintiff class from recovering because the employer's unlawful
discrimination was the plant closure itself.253 An award of backpay is
necessary because the wrongful discharge was intertwined with the
company's intent to interfere with the plaintiffs' pension benefits.254 Thus,
had it not been for McDonnell Douglas's impermissible and discriminatory
termination, the plaintiffs would have remained at their employment and
continued to receive pay.255 Since the employer intended to defeat pension
rights, it was only just and appropriate to award backpay to a plaintiff class
who would have remained at their positions, receiving their pay, but for the
256unlawful discrimination. Lastly, awarding backpay ensures the proper
deterrent effect on employers who terminate employees in order to defeat
employees' pension rights 57 Put simply, failing to award backpay would
reward McDonnell Douglas for its action of unlawfully closing its Tulsa
plant as part of its plan to interfere with and pilfer the employees' pension
benefits.
The plaintiffs also asked for reinstatement or front pay in lieu of
258reinstatement. In order to receive prospective equitable relief, the courtrequired the plaintiffs to prove that the business would have remained open
251. Id. at *4.
252. Id. at *5 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,421 (1975) (second
and third alterations in original)).
253. Id. at *5 n.3 (contemplating the possibility that if backpay is unrecoverable as a
matter of law under section 510, potentially liable employers would purposely prolong
litigation to avoid the possibility of reinstatement and evade having to ever pay backpay). In
the instant case, McDonnell Douglas's discovery fiasco would have allowed McDonnell
Douglas to retain over eight years worth of employees' salaries despite its illegal termination
under section 510. See id. at *5 n.3. Such an interpretation would render ERISA's protections
for pension beneficiaries a token for employees and a boon for employers, in the face of ever-
increasing corporate abuse and plant closures. Response Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 45-47,
Millsap, 2002 WL 31386076 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 2003) (No. 03-5124).
254. See Millsap, 2002 WL 31386076, at *4-5.
255. Id. at *5.
256. See id.
257. See id. at *5 n.3.
258. Id. at *6.
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past their unlawful discharge by the defendant. 219 In a previous Tenth
Circuit front pay suit, it was held that where a defendant company closed its
operations before the judgment, both front pay and reinstatement were
impossible.260 Thus the district court found that, eight years since the Tulsa
plant closing, "a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that, but for the
discriminatory conduct, Defendant's plant would still be open today.
2 6'
The plaintiffs countered that reinstatement may have been possible at
another facility, such as Rockwell, prior to Boeing's purchase of that plant,
or reinstatement at McDonnell Douglas's St. Louis plant.12 Without proof
of the employer's intention to retain or transfer the plaintiffs, the court
could not sustain a claim based on reinstatement or front pay.2 63
Of course, in other civil rights cases, and even among some ERISA
retaliatory discharge cases, front pay has been awarded even where
reinstatement was impossible or impracticable.26
Finally, the plaintiff class sought reimbursement for lost health benefits
for retirees and those benefits lost during the backpay accrual period.265 The
district court did not determine whether these benefits were recoverable,
nor did they determine how to value the lost health benefits.2 6 Prior to
closing its Tulsa plant, McDonnell Douglas cancelled its coverage for
salaried, retired, and non-union employees, and those parties were thus
267excluded from asserting any rights in retiree health benefits. Both
salaried and hourly workers could contest their rights to health benefits
during the backpay period. 2"s A split in the circuits exists over the value of
lost health benefits, which can be measured by the form of replacement
insurance costs, by the actual medical costs incurred by the plaintiff, or the
cost of the insurance premiums had the defendant paid absent the illegal
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors, Inc., 972 F.2d 1212, 1215 (10th Cir. 1992)).
261. Id.
262. Id. (referencing Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982), and
Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 629 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
263. Millsap, 2002 WL 31386076, at *6-7.
264. Brian S. Felton, Note, Jury Computation of Front Pay Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 76 MINN. L. REV. 985, 985 n.4 (1992); Eileen Kuklis, Comment, The
Future of Front Pay Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Will It Be Sufficient to the Damage
Caps?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 465,465-66 (1996).
265. See Millsap, 2002 WL 31386076, at *7.
266. See id. at *8.
267. Id. at *7 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995))
("[F]inding retirees have no vested right to health care benefits because an employer that
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discrimination. Judge Holmes followed a Western District Court of
Virginia decision in holding that "the value of lost medical benefits is
properly measured by 'the value of premiums that [the employer] would
have paid had plaintiff continued working.' ' 270 Judge Holmes recognized
that "health insurance has value, 'even to healthy people, if only because it
provides peace of mind that medical expenses will be covered should they
occur.,
' 271
C. Stipulated Settlement and the Certified Question of Law on Backpay
on Appeal
Following Judge Holmes' strident dismissal of McDonnell Douglas's
motion for summary judgment on the issue of backpay, McDonnell Douglas
settled with the Millsap plaintiffs on the pension and health benefits claims
and sought a certified question of law on appeal on the issue of backpay
72
In February 2003, the parties proposed a "Stipulation of Settlement" in
private mediation.2 7 ' The stipulated settlement was contingent upon the
Tenth Circuit's certification on the question of law on the issue of
backpay 74 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected Judge Holmes'
endorsement of an award of backpay as a civil remedy under ERISA .
Circuit Judge Baldock, delivering the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit,
269. Id. (citing Pearce v. Carrier Corp., 966 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1992), Kossman v. Calumet
City, 800 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1986), and Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986)).
270. Id. (quoting Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 95-0059-H, 1997 WL 38138 (W.D.
Va. Jan. 28, 1997). In so holding, Judge Holmes also rejected the Ninth Circuit's position that
health insurance lacks a monetary benefit unless expenses are actually incurred. Id. at *8
(citing Galindo, 793 F.2d at 1517).
271. Id. at *8 (quoting Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., No. K84-433 CAB, 1988 WL 156345,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 9,1988)). Additionally, if a plaintiff made an honest effort but failed
to find substitute insurance and incurred medical expenses beyond what McDonnell Douglas
would have paid, absent the discriminatory termination, the plaintiff, Judge Holmes ruled, is
entitled to the costs of actual medical expenses incurred. Id.
272. Gary Young, Rare Settlement in Plant-Closing Case, NAT'L L.J., June 9, 2003, at 17.
The settlement allowed for a rare settlement on the pension benefits issue for a $36 million
common fund to be established for the plaintiff class members. Id. at 20. However, another
dispute arose as to the amount of attorney's fees to award to class counsel. Id. at 17,20. Jack
Walbran, Vice President for Boeing, who purchased McDonnell Douglas following the Tulsa
plant shut-down, pointed to Great-West for the company's decision to settle the pension
benefits portion contingent upon the appellate court's acceptance of the question of law on
backpay. Id. at 20. Mr. Walbran went on to explain that it was his company's stance that
under Great-West, backpay was not available in ERISA cases, suggesting that the appellate
court would be more favorable to McDonnell Douglas's position. See id.
273. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2003 WL 21277124, at *2
(N.D. Okla. May 28, 2003), rev'd, 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
274. Id. at *3 n.13. The court of appeals granted certification on July 14, 2003. See
Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1247-48.
275. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 2004).
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found that ERISA section 502 simply did not allow for any remedy not
specifically enumerated in the statute itself.27 6  Asserting that it was
following the Mertens and Great-West decisions, the court held that the
Millsap plaintiffs were barred from collecting backpay, as it was not a
demand under equitable relief, but rather as a traditional legal remedy.277
Judge Baldock noted that the plaintiffs' own method of calculating their
backpay precluded them from collecting backpay under equitable
principles. 78
The circuit court rejected this on the basis that the damages the plaintiffs
sought were not to counter unjust enrichment, but to compensate the
plaintiff class for their termination.2  The circuit court concluded that
where the equitable relief sought- reinstatement- becomes impossible, so
does the court's ability to award backpay
Judge Baldock called attention to the fact that ERISA did not specifically
281include backpay as an equitable remedy. Congress did, however,
specifically include backpay in both Title VII and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), the two other labor statutes to which Millsap
plaintiffs and other plaintiffs (and courts considering their cases) had
276. Id. at 1250. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress'
deliberate care in comprehensively drafting ERISA's enforcement scheme 'provide[s] strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)). Further, Judge Baldock felt that ERISA's carefully drafted
"'comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for
enforcement' did not allow for an equitable remedy such as backpay. Id. (quoting Russell,
473 U.S. at 147).
277. Id. at 1251, 1253 (citing ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 9.3 (1992), DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5), at 227 n.15
(2d ed. 1993), and 2 HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 9.46 (4th ed. 1998)) (finding that "[B]ackpay is compensatory because the award is measured
by an employee's loss rather than an employer's gain").
278. Id. at 1254. The plaintiffs' calculation was based upon each former employee's loss
rather than McDonnell Douglas's gain. Id. Judge Baldock thus excluded their demand on the
basis that it fell under compensatory damages, a straight legal remedy not allowable under
section 502 of ERISA. Id. at 1251, 1254. The plaintiff class cannot collect backpay when
classified as compensatory damages, which are typically viewed by the Supreme Court as an
ordinary damages claim. Id. at 1253 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11 (1999)).
279. Id. at 1255 n.9.
280. Id. at 1255-56 (citing Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers, 494 U.S. 558, 571
(1990)). In both Millsap and Terry, the reinstatement claim was dismissed due to
impossibility. Id. at 1255. Despite this, plaintiffs attempted to counter that an equity court
possessed the power to award legal relief and, in addition, that a court sitting in equity should
award backpay as incidental to a request for reinstatement. Id. Again, the Court disposed of
the plaintiffs' argument, finding backpay and reinstatement to be entirely independent and
separate types of relief. Id. at 1257.
281. Id. at 1258.
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analogized. 2 The circuit court further reasoned that while Title VII and
the NLRA seek to redress the effect a discriminatory action has on an
individual, ERISA only seeks to redress actions that have a negative impact
on an ERISA benefits plan, not the individual's rights.283 The Millsap
plaintiffs' policy contentions, so strenuously pressed by the district court,
also failed to persuade the Tenth Circuit.28 In closing, Judges Baldock and
Tymkovich found that McDonnell Douglas had to compensate the plaintiffs
for their lost benefits but, under ERISA, possessed no liability for
compensatory damages in the form of backpay
D. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lucero
Dissenting Judge Lucero pointed out that the circuit court's decision not
only failed to deter employers seeking to violate ERISA, but also rewarded
employers who engage in discovery abuses, like McDonnell Douglas had.2 86
As Judge Lucero indicated, neither of the Supreme Court's holdings in
Mertens or Great-West explicitly bar awarding backpay under ERISA
287section 502, thus leaving the lower courts to determine the issue. Judge
Lucero pointed out the contradiction inherent in the majority's reference to
Dobbs' Law on Remedies, which concedes that in wrongful termination and
discrimination situations, backpay can indeed be considered an equitable
remedy.2 m The Mertens decision excluded compensatory damages as
equitable relief, but statutory creations of backpay, Judge Lucero explains,
are a phenomenon of the latter part of the twentieth century, thereby
289
displacing antiquated rules of legal and equitable divisions.
The dissent argued, the majority's decision failed to directly address the
meaning of ERISA section 502, but instead relied on Great-West and
282. Id. at 1257-58; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000).
283. Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1259 ("ERISA, unlike Title VII and the NLRA, is not a make-
whole statute."). The court also cited to its own decision in Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc.,
72 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1995), in which the court refused to interpret ERISA as a make
whole statute and instead sought "to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans." Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1259 (citing Zimmerman, 72 F.3d at 828).
284. See Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1259. But see Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223,
229 (2d Cir. 2002); Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1999);
Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir. 1995).
285. See Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1260 n.20. The majority does suggest, however, that the
aggrieved plaintiffs could seek backpay under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Id. at 1260.
286. See id. at 1261, 1266 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (noting that reinstatement became
impossible as the trial lasted eight years due in large part to McDonnell Douglas's repeated
attempts to delay the trial).
287. See id. at 1262.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1261, 1263.
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Mertens to answer the question whether backpay is equitable in nature
despite the fact that these two decisions left the question open to
interpretation.2 9 The language of section 502, "appropriate equitable
relief," leaves open to the courts the determination of what may be the
291
appropriate relief to redress the ERISA violations at bar. While this is
ambiguous, a court must turn to legislative history to determine
congressional intent. Again, contrary to the majority's interpretation of
ERISA section502, Congress intended that the "'primary purpose of the bill
is the protection of individual pension rights.'
292
The Tenth Circuit had previously held in Skinner v. Total Petroleum,
Inc.,293 that "the characterization of backpay as legal or equitable has been
determined by whether the plaintiff has requested backpay as an adjunct to
the equitable remedy of reinstatement., 294 In another Tenth Circuit
decision, Bertot v. School District No. 1,291 the court affirmed that "'back pay
... is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement and is not
comparable to damages in a common law action." 296 In the Millsap dissent,
Judge Lucero ultimately "conclude[d] that back pay is appropriate
equitable relief as contemplated by ERISA § 502(a)(3) under the present
circumstances" presented by the Millsap plaintiffs.297
DID CONGRESS MEAN TO IDENTIFY A WRONG WITHOUT
CREATING A REMEDY?
Despite what the High Court says, neither it nor the myriad of district or
circuit courts have ever approached ERISA remedies with any consistency.
Soon after the passage of the now-dreaded ERISA,299 courts were generous
both in their recognition of their own authority to create remedies and in
the awards themselves. The open and imprecise language suggested that
Congress decided to defer to the courts in establishing appropriate relief to
employees wrongfully discharged.299 As many courts have noted, ERISA is
rooted in the common law of trusts, and trust remedies can be fairly
290. Id. at 1262-63.
291. See id. at 1263.
292. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1973)).
293. 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988).
294. Id. at 1444.
295. 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979).
296. Id. at 250 (alteration in original) (quoting Harmon v. May Broad. Co., 583 F.2d 410,
411 (8th Cir. 1978)).
297. Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1266 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
298. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 23, at 32 ("Other than tax cases, what set of Supreme
Court decisions could be less interesting? Indeed, rumor has it that one well-known reason for
recommending denial of certiorari is that 'this is an ERISA case."').
299. See ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
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creative.3 0 The Supreme Court has written that Congress did not need to
be overly specific in either its proscriptions or its remedies. ' In 1985, the
Court decided an ERISA case in which an employer contested the right of
trustees to demand an accounting of a fiduciary/sponsor. 30 2 In Century
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport,
Inc., the Court considered ERISA to be a broad grant of power to the
federal government and the courts to establish a trust regime from a statute
that was vague, and, in some cases, inarticulate.3 3 As with most labor
statutes, interstitial lawmaking would become the norm. The Court
concluded:
In general, trustees' responsibilities and powers under ERISA
reflect Congress' policy of "assuring the equitable character" of
the plans. Thus, rather than explicitly enumerating all of the
powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress
invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of
their authority and responsibility. Under the common law of
trusts, as under [these] trust agreements, trustees are understood
to have all "such powers as are necessary or appropriate for the
carrying out of the purposes of the trust."3°4
In recognizing ERISA's extremely broad preemptive effect on similar
state laws, the Supreme Court explained that specific ERISA provisions,
like section 510's prohibition against interference with or retaliation for the
enjoyment of employee benefits, completely supplant any state law claims
for wrongful, tortious discharge. 3°5 Fortunately, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, °6 where an employee claimed he was discharged specifically
for the purpose of preventing his vesting in a pension plan, the Court
300. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. ERISA's legislative history confirms
that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions, 'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA]
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."' (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting H. R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973))). Justice O'Connor
continued: "Given this language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a 'federal
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."' Id. (quoting Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
301. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56; Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1984).
302. See Cent. States, 472 U.S. at 561.
303. See id. at 570; see also Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56.
304. Cent. States, 472 U.S. at 570 (quoting 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 186, at 1496 (3d
ed. 1967)); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26
(1983) ("[A] body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."' (quoting 120
CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
305. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56.
306. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
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happily opined that sufficient remedies abound.3 7 "Not only is § 502(a) the
exclusive remedy for vindicating § 510-protected rights, but there is no basis
in § 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek
'pension benefits.' It is clear that the relief requested here is well within the
power of federal courts to provide."3 8 Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor opined that an employee's suit for lost future wages, mental
anguish, and punitive damages was "well within the power of the federal
courts to provide" under 502(a)(3)." 9  At that point in ERISA
jurisprudential history, the proof of the claim, not the receipt of remedies,
was the problem for most plaintiffs.1
The Millsap plaintiffs were denied backpay, after proving that their
employer intentionally closed its plant to interfere with their ERISA
benefits, because of dicta in radically different kinds of cases. 31' Most
scholars and courts track the incipience of the constriction of potential
ERISA remedies to Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell.
312
In this case, an insurance claims adjuster who was a beneficiary under two
employee benefit plans administered by her employer and governed by
ERISA brought suit against the employer in the California Superior Court
based on an interruption in benefits from October 17, 1979, when her
benefits were terminated, to March 11, 1980, when her eligibility was
restored. Although the plaintiff ultimately received all the benefits to
which she was entitled under the plan, she alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
based on the allegedly improper refusal to pay benefits during the period in
question and sought to hold the employer, as a fiduciary, personally liable
for extracontractual compensatory and punitive damages.3 4 The section on
which the plaintiff based her claim explicitly defines the duty of a fiduciary
to manage the property and fringe benefit funds professionally and in the• -- 315
best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Court first
307. See id. at 145.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 136, 145.
310. See Lorraine Schmall, Toward Full Participation and Protection of the Worker with
Illness: The Failure of Federal Health Law After McGann v. H & H Music Co., 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 781,788 (1994) ("Unlike most other sections of ERISA, section 510 provides
ample remedies ... Section 510 is unique in this regard: most ERISA remedies are rather
weak and ineffective."); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'
Rights by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 671-72
(1994).
311. See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1248-49, 1260 (10th Cir.
2004).
312. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
313. Id. at 136-37.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 139 & n.5.
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decided that any remedy for a violation of ERISA's fiduciary duties would
run to the plan, not to a plan participant."6 The Court also noted that the
civil enforcement provisions lay out the two kinds of claims a participant
can make: one for benefits or one for clarification of rights under a plan.37
Accordingly, the Court decided that remedies other than benefits are not
available to individual plaintiffs."' So far, so good. The plaintiff got
everything she was owed, albeit somewhat belatedly, and she had to make
do without a big money judgment from her employer for her inconvenience
and aggravation. In other labor contexts, state claims for bad faith
insurance adjusting cannot escape federal preemption, even where such
petty claims are irremediable under federal labor law. 31 9 Barring the
plaintiff from state remedies for her ERISA plan administrator's delay in
paying her health insurance claims sets no particular precedent for denying
wrongfully-discharged factory workers a make-whole remedy.
The next Supreme Court consideration of equitable damages was in a, • 320
case with another unique set of facts. In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, a
class of former employees who participated in the Kaiser Steel Corporation
321
Retirement Plan sued Hewitt Associates, the plan's actuary. When Kaiser
began to phase out its steelmaking operations, many plan participants opted
for early retirement.322 The plaintiffs claimed that Hewitt failed to change
the plan's actuarial assumptions to reflect the additional retirement costs,
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation
of section 411 of this Act.
Id. at 139 (quoting ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000)). The Court also explained:
"Because respondent relies entirely on § 409(a), and expressly disclaims reliance on §
502(a)(3), we have no occasion to consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorizes
recovery of extracontractual damages." Id. at 139 n.5.
316. Id. at 144.
317. Id. at 139-40.
318. Id. at 148.
319. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,203,220-21 (1985). In Allis-
Chalmers, an employee's Wisconsin state law tort claim against his employer for a bad-faith
delay in making disability benefit payments due under a collective-bargaining agreement was
pre-empted by federal labor contract law. Id. at 202, 208, 221.
320. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). "Thus, although we acknowledge the oddity of resolving a
dispute over remedies where it is unclear that a remediable wrong has been alleged, we decide
this case on the narrow battlefield the parties have chosen, and reserve decision of that
antecedent question." Id. at 254-55.




causing the plan to be funded inadequately and eventually to be
terminated.323 Consequently, the remaining participants were left with a
bankrupt plan, and received only the much-diminished benefits available
from the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, rather than the
substantially greater pensions due them under the company plan.324
"Petitioners sought certiorari only on the question whether ERISA
authorizes suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly
participate in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty."3 The Court squarely
rejected the claim for relief: "Although they often dance around the word,
what petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory damages -
monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged
breach of fiduciary duties. Money damages are, of course, the classic form
of legal relief." '326 The Court read ERISA's language limiting plaintiffs to
"equitable" relief as requiring courts to award what historically was
included in equity."' The Supreme Court acknowledged that equity courts,
being moral and legal in nature, could fashion any kind of remedy, both
legal and equitable. 8 But, asserted Justice Scalia, Congress could not have
used the word "equity" to mean equitable or legal.32 9 "'Equitable' relief
must mean something less than all relief.,
330
Moreover, the factual context of the case bothered the Court. There are
labor department regulations and specific statutory provisions that relate to
joint and several liability among co-fiduciaries. 33 ' Hewitt, hired by the
fund's managing fiduciary, might not have been liable in the first place
under any interpretation of ERISA. The lawsuit the beneficiaries wanted
to bring, rather than advancing ERISA's policy goals, could actually defeat
them. Asking an actuary to make whole any losses to a plan based on its
imprecise predictions would extend liability to heretofore unheard-of levels:
323. Id.
324. Id. To protect against the risk of underfunding and failed plans, ERISA provides an
insurance scheme for defined benefit plans administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), a government-created corporation. ERISA §§ 4002(a), 4022-4022(a),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a), 1322-1322(a) (2000). Every plan must make a premium payment to
cover the cost of the insurance. Id. § 4007(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1307(a). If a plan fails, the insurance
covers some, but not all, of the losses. Id. § 4022a(b)-(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1322a(b)-(c). A primary
limit on coverage is a cap on the maximum benefits the PBGC will pay. See id.
325. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251.
326. Id. at 255.
327. Id. at 257-58.
328. Id. at 256; see also Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious
Origins, Feudal Christian Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of
Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 483,483-84 (1997).
329. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258.
330. Id. at 258 n.8.
331. See id. at 262.
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Exposure to that sort of liability would impose high insurance
costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to
ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves. There is,
in other words, a "tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of
benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing
pension costs." We will not attempt to adjust the balance between
those competing goals that the text adopted by Congress has
struck .332
The remedies were, at best, tangential to the scheme and purpose of
ERISA. The plan's managers, even without assigning liability, could have
been asked to make the plan whole. 333 Dissenting in Mertens, Justice White
lamented: "the anomaly [to interpret] ERISA in a way that 'would afford
less protection to employees . .. than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted. ''3 34 Examining the history of equitable remedies-and their object
of putting parties in the position they would have been had there been no
breach of trust-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
O'Connor agreed that "'appropriate equitable relief,"' described in section
3 of ERISA's civil action provisions, "encompass[es] what was equity's
routine remedy for such breaches-a compensatory monetary award
calculated to make the victims whole., 35 Courts did not abandon make-
whole remedies across the board after Mertens, and there were a panoply of
336equitable awards thereafter. Mertens was primarily understood as a case
332. Id. at 262-63 (citations omitted) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504, 515 (1981)).
333. In fact, liability insurance policies can cover trustee-caused losses.
334. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)).
335. Id. at 266.
336. See, e.g., Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 755 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Mertens simply
holds that only 'equitable relief' is available under Section 502(a)(3), and that this phrase does
not include the collection of damages from persons who are not fiduciaries but act in concert
with those who are fiduciaries. Nothing in Mertens precludes an award of traditional equitable
relief, including an injunction, restitution, and the like." (citation omitted)), affd, 516 U.S. 489
(1996); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n
individual may seek equitable relief from a breach of fiduciary duty under section
1132(a)(3)."). The Tenth Circuit has delineated between legal and equitable relief of backpay
in Title VII cases by inquiring whether backpay was requested as a supplement to equitable
relief or as an element of legal damages for breach of the employment contract. See Skinner v.
Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (10th Cir. 1988).
In Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995), the Sixth Circuit held that backpay
sought pursuant to a retaliatory discharge claim under ERISA is equitable in nature. Id. at
1021-22; Russell v. Northrup Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The
Second Circuit has also avoided limiting section 502's remedial reach in Dunnigan v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 277 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2002), reasoning that ERISA was not
adopted "'in isolation."' Id. at 229 (quoting Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138,147
(2d Cir. 1999)) (observing that both the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII allow for
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about non-fiduciary liability, not as a bulwark against make-whole remedies
across-the-board .337
It may not have been until 2002 when Justice Scalia cited his own
opinions in Russell and Mertens that anything resembling a line of decisions
about remedies came into being.338 A third decision completes the
triumvirate noted for denying make-whole remedies to plaintiffs who
establish an ERISA violation: Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson.39 The Court's observers claim that this case allowed the Court to
ultimately become convinced that equitable remedies could not be
expanded beyond what they were in 1783.340 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, identified the subrogation claim of a plan against the proceeds of a
third party lawsuit as a suit for "specific performance of a contractual
obligation to pay past due sums, 3 4' which, indeed, it was.
Janette Knudson was rendered quadriplegic by a car accident in
June 1992. [The insurance plan offered by her husband's
employer] covered $411,157.11 of Janette's medical expenses, of
which all except $75,000 was paid by petitioner Great-West Life &
Annuity Insurance Co. pursuant to a "stop-loss" insurance
agreement with the Plan.
... [T]he Knudsons filed a tort action in California state court
seeking to recover from Hyundai Motor Company, the
manufacturer of the car they were riding in at the time of the
accident, and other alleged tortfeasors. The parties to that action
negotiated a $650,000 settlement, a notice of which was mailed to
backpay under "'other appropriate relief"'). The Second Circuit in Strom, and later
Dunnigan, found that backpay was a "make-whole remedy... [that] sought to 'eliminate the
direct economic effect of an alleged violation of the statute,' and did not seek any of the other
subjects of compensation found in traditional tort damages." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting
Strom, 202 F.3d at 147); see also Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d 495,498 (7th Cir.
1999) ("Equity sometimes awards monetary relief .. "); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine
Workers, Health & Ret. Fund of 1974, 165 F.3d 209,212 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding ERISA to be a
make-whole remedy entitling the plaintiff to an award of interest where the plan participant
finally received the benefits due, but the plan received an unjust enrichment in the delay of
payment).
337. See Strom, 202 F.3d at 148.
338. Even Justice Scalia was unsure all make-whole remedies were completely precluded
by ERISA, as he observed in Mertens: "We note at the outset that it is far from clear that,
even if this provision does make money damages available, it makes them available for the
actions at issue here." Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993).
339. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
340. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317,1319,1356-57
(2003).
341. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207, 212.
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Great-West. This allocated $256,745.30 to a Special Needs Trust[,
created pursuant to a California statute describing such trusts
which would] provide for Janette's medical care; $373,426 to
attorney's fees and costs; $5,000 to reimburse the California
Medicaid program (Medi-Cal); and $13,828.70 (the portion of the
settlement attributable to past medical expenses) to satisfy Great-
West's claim under the reimbursement provision of the Plan.
Great-West [sued for] injunctive and declaratory relief under §
502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement provision of the Plan by
requiring the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any
proceeds recovered from third parties.342
The Court decided that the remedy Great-West sought was unavailable.343
"Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability on
respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that was not
typically available in equity. 'A claim for money due and owing under a
contract is "quintessentially an action at law..'' '  Not even restitution
could provide Great-West relief. The money in the Special Needs Trust
was not in the possession of the defendants; therefore, it could not qualify as
an identifiable res which plaintiffs could attach.145  "The basis for
petitioners' claim is not that respondents hold particular funds that, in good
conscience, belong to petitioners, but that petitioners are contractually
entitled to some funds for benefits that they conferred, 3 46 which is a patent
claim for reimbursement, i.e., legal money damages.
Both Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented, concluding as they had in
the two earlier cases that equitable remedies under ERISA should have
afforded plaintiffs relief. 47 They agreed that it was "fanciful to assume that
in 1974 Congress intended to revive the obsolete distinctions between law
and equity as a basis for defining the remedies available in federal court for
violations of the terms of a plan under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
3 4
1
Justice Ginsburg was appalled at the majority's emasculation of ERISA
and its salutary purpose. She wrote:
The Court is no doubt correct that "vague notions of a statute's
'basic purpose' are ... inadequate to overcome the words of its
342. Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted).
343. Id. at 221.
344. Id. at 210 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398,401 (7th Cir. 2000)).
345. Id. at 214.
346. Id.
347. See id. at 222-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 234 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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text regarding the specific issue under consideration. But when
Congress' clearly stated purpose so starkly conflicts with
questionable inferences drawn from a single word in the statute, it
is the latter, and not the former, that must give way.
It is particularly ironic that the majority acts in the name of
equity as it sacrifices congressional intent and statutory purpose to
archaic and unyielding doctrine. "Equity eschews mechanical
rules; it depends on flexibility." And "[a]s this Court long ago
recognized, 'there is inherent in the Courts of Equity a jurisdiction
to... give effect to the policy of the legislature.
Separately, these three decisions cannot justify the conclusion that all
remedies that cost a losing defendant money are barred outright by ERISA.
Even together, they are no more than a trio of cases in which specific
rights-timely payment of a claim; subrogation; the protection of a fund
corpus-were recognized but their infringement not remedied as the
plaintiffs prayed. In two of the cases, the claims sounded clearly in contract.
Those are vastly, and significantly, different from claims of retaliatory
discharge, which are based on clear public policy.
The case whose claims are closest, conceptually, to Millsap and the chink
in the continuously evolving firewall against make-whole remedies is Varity
Corp. v. Howe.35 Some 1500 beneficiaries of the benefit plan sued the
employer as the plan's administrator, claiming that it had, "through
trickery, led them to withdraw from the plan and to forfeit their benefits. 
,351
There were also about 4000 retired workers whose benefit plans were
transferred to a newly-created, but losing division.352 Plaintiffs sought,
among other things, an order that, in essence, would reinstate each of them
as a participant in the employer's ERISA plan.353 After petitioner Varity
Corporation decided to transfer money-losing divisions in its subsidiary,
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey
Combines, it held a meeting to persuade employees of the failing divisions
to change employers and benefit plans.31 4 Varity, the Massey-Ferguson plan
administrator as well as the employer, conveyed the basic message that
349. Id. at 227-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Since most circuit and federal courts consider the proof and the remedy in analogous civil
rights cases, it is significant that Justice Ginsburg cites to a Title VII decision. Id. at 228 (citing
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) ("'[W]hen Congress invokes the
Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the
principled application of standards consistent with those purposes."' (alteration in original))).
350. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
351. Id. at 491-92, 494.
352. Id. at 494.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 493-94.
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employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred.355 In fact,
Massey Combines was insolvent from the day it was created, and, when it
ended its second year in a receivership, the employees who had transferred
lost their non-pension benefits.56
Justice Breyer wrote for the majority and summarized the facts thusly:
The business plan-which Varity called "Project Sunshine"-
amounted to placing many of Varity's money-losing eggs in one
financially rickety basket. It called for a transfer of Massey-
Ferguson's money-losing divisions, along with various other debts,
to a newly created, separately incorporated subsidiary called
Massey Combines. The plan foresaw the possibility that Massey
Combines would fail. But it viewed such a failure, from Varity's
business perspective, as closer to a victory than to a defeat. That
is because Massey Combine's failure would not only eliminate
several of Varity's poorly performing divisions, but it would also
eradicate various debts that Varity would transfer to Massey
Combines, and which, in the absence of the reorganization,
Varity's more profitable subsidiaries or divisions might have to
pay.
Among the obligations that Varity hoped the reorganization
would eliminate were those arising from the Massey-Ferguson
benefit plan's promises to pay medical and other nonpension
benefits to employees of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing
divisions. Rather than terminate those benefits directly (as it had
retained the right to do), Varity attempted to avoid the
undesirable fallout that could have accompanied cancellation by
inducing the failing divisions' employees to switch employers and
thereby voluntarily release Massey-Ferguson from its obligation to
provide them benefits (effectively substituting the new, self-
funded Massey Combines benefit plan for the former Massey-
Ferguson plan). Insofar as Massey-Ferguson's employees did so, a
subsequent Massey Combines failure would eliminate-simply
and automatically, without distressing the remaining Massey-
Ferguson employees-what would otherwise have been Massey-
Ferguson's obligation to pay those employees their benefits.357
The Eighth Circuit fashioned a make-whole remedy for the plaintiffs:
The Retired Class should receive $696,195, an award in the nature
of restitution to compensate them for benefits of which, at the
time of trial, they had been deprived. The Retired Class should
also receive restitution for benefits accrued between the time of
355. Id. at 494.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 493.
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trial and the entry of a final decree on remand. Finally, they are
entitled to an injunction reinstating them as members of the M-F
Welfare Benefits Plan under the terms of that plan as it existed at
the time of retirement."'
Similar relief was granted to the employees whose benefits had been
transferred to the losing division.159 These were "equitable" damages,
according to the reviewing court,"' a conclusion the Supreme Court allowed
to stand.36'
The relief awarded includes payments of money that plaintiffs
would have received if they had remained members of the M-F
Plan, but we do not think these payments can properly be
characterized as "damages," and thus unavailable under Section
502(a)(3). Rather, we view the payments as restitution. Equity
will treat that as done which ought to have been done. Or, to put
it in words that fit the present case more precisely, equity will
disregard that which ought not to have been done. Plaintiffs
should never have been lured away from M-F into the financially
shaky MCC. The payments we are ordering are exactly what
plaintiffs would have gotten if they had remained at M-F. They
are restored to their rightful position. This is restitution, and the
Supreme Court in Mertens twice lists "restitution" as a type of
equitable relief available under Section 502(a)(3). The statute
itself mentions not only injunctions but also "other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress ... violations" of ERISA.
As scores of other courts had done before, the Eighth Circuit recognized
that "[p]ayments of past-due benefits are analogous to awards of back pay
in Title VII cases, relief uniformly regarded as equitable.,
363
In approving a remedy as close as it could get to make-whole for these
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court recognized that imprecisely defined "fiduciary
duties draw much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law
that governed most benefit plans before ERISA's enactment. '' 364 The
Eighth Circuit stated: "We also recognize, however, that trust law does not
tell the entire story. After all, ERISA's standards and procedural
358. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 756-57.
361. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 515.
362. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d at 756-57 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
ERISA § 502 (a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000)).
363. Id. at 757 (referencing again to Mertens as analogizing the remedies available under
ERISA to those available under Title VII).
364. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496 (citing Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.
Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559,570 (1985), H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3-5, 11-13 (1973), and
G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 255, at 343 (rev. 2d ed. 1992)).
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protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common
law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection. 3 65 As if
anticipating the Millsap plaintiff's petition, the Court continued:
Consequently, we believe that the law of trusts often will
inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an
effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties. In some instances,
trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts must go
on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute,
its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law
trust requirements.3 6
In Varity Corp., not only did the Court's majority read the remedies
provisions broadly, but it also recognized that fiduciary breaches can create
a remedy for individual participants, and not just the plan itself. 6 ' The
irony is that it is a purposive reading of the statute that moves the Court
toward its approval of the remedy:
ERISA's basic purposes favor a reading of the third subsection
that provides the plaintiffs with a remedy. The statute itself says
that it seeks "to protect.., the interests of participants.., and...
beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries ... and.., providing
for appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the Federal
courts." Section 404(a), in furtherance of this general objective,
requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries." Given these objectives, it is
hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches
of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured
beneficiaries a remedy.368
Writing for the majority in Great-West, Justice Scalia distinguished Varity
Corp., the holding of which he found not contrary to the Court's conclusion
that equity excludes anything that looks like money. 69 Apparently, he was
365. Id. at 497 (citing ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000), and H.R. REP. No. 93-
533, at 3-5, 11-13).
And, even with respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA imposes,
Congress "expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the
other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of
employee benefit plans" as they "develop a 'federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."'
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 302, and
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-111 (1989)).
366. Id.
367. Seeid. at513.
368. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting ERISA §§ 2(b), 404(a), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001(b), 1024(a)).
369. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 & n.5 (2002).
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satisfied with the Eighth Circuit's arguments that the money damages
allowed each plaintiff were equitable, and not legal.370 For some reason not
clear from the facts of Varity Corp., the Great-West Court further argued
that Varity Corp. did not depart from its three-case run on limiting the
extent of equitable remedies because "[i]n Varity Corp. . . . it was
undisputed that respondents were seeking equitable relief, and the question
was whether such relief was 'appropriate' in light of the apparent lack of
alternative remedies."37' In reality, the Varity Corp. plaintiffs got very
creative remedies: an injunction ordering each plaintiff reinstated in a
solvent company ERISA health plan and dollar-for-dollar reimbursement
for lost benefits. 32 The whole claim in Varity Corp., nota bene, was not
retaliatory discharge or transfer with the express purpose of interfering with
their benefits. Perhaps it could or should have been. It was, instead, a
novel but not too radical claim that when plan fiduciaries lie outright to
plan participants, they breach their fiduciary duties. However, like section
510, suits for breach of the fiduciary duty must be brought under the third
section of 502, which allows for suits for violations of any part of ERISA. 3 7 3
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE AS A PROTOYPICAL CAUSE OF
ACTION
General inquiry into the purpose of ERISA or the logical result of its
enforcement mechanisms, as interpreted by the courts, is arguably all that is
needed to establish the propriety of backpay for section 510 violations.
More specifically, it is hard to imagine any legislative protection against
discriminatory job loss that can be remedied any other way.374 Until the
370. See id. at 218 & n.4; Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516
U.S. 489 (1996). Both retirees and those employees whose benefit obligations were
transferred to the insolvent subsidiary got $696,195, which the court called "an award in the
nature of restitution to compensate them for benefits of which, at the time of trial, they had
been deprived." Id.
371. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 n.5; see also Clyde W. Summers, Individualism,
Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 453,461
(2001) (discussing unlawful discharge in violation of public policy).
372. See Varity Corp., 36 F.3d at 756.
373. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510; Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246,
1247 (10th Cir. 2004).
374. Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) specifically prohibits
employers from firing or discriminating against an employee because the employee has
asserted his or her rights under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000). Section 216
provides, inter alia:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be
liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of section 215(a)(3), including without limitation employment,
reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages.
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Supreme Court decided that ERISA section 510 preempts and supplants all
common law claims for wrongful discharge, state courts "expressly
recognized the public policy associated with the preservation of pension
plans for both governmental and private employees." '375 Where an
employee or class of employees proves that the company intentionally
interfered with ERISA benefits, and, as a result, employees lost their jobs
(and their wages), courts can interpret the confusing language of the statute
by deciding what Congress meant to accomplish. As immense and
reticulated as ERISA is said to be, it certainly represents a public policy to
protect promised employee benefits. This jurisprudence is well-developed,
both in state and federal courts.376 When a plant full of the employees with
the most costly ERISA benefits is closed, with the express purpose of saving
the money that would be spent on these benefits, the resulting loss of jobs is
due to the employer's discrimination against employees with benefits. The
only incentive against such discharges, like those where the motive
emanates from an employer's intentional interference with other
statutorily-created rights, like protection against race-based discrimination,
or protection for whistleblowers, is a remedy that puts the discriminatee in
the place she would have been without the illegality. More importantly,
section 510 discharges not only cause employees economic loss, they1 77
actually present a net gain for the wrongdoer.
Apparent in the passage of ERISA is that employer interference with
ERISA rights thwarts public policy and must be remedied, for the lack of a
378better term, in the usual way. Public policy is not a precise concept, but
neither is it amorphous:
There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be
said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what
affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the
Id. § 216(b).
375. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69,71 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133
(1990); see also Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
376. See Elizabeth H. Confer, Employment Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 805.810 (1999) ("A
series of cases in the 1970s provided the 'framework of the types of employer actions that
violate "public policy."' They established the foundation for causes of action currently
recognized as retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy- that is, discharge contrary to
a core societal value. These cases 'recognized that strict adherence to the at-will doctrine
could bring potential harm to society in general."' (footnotes omitted)).
377. While Mertens seemingly foreclosed the plaintiffs' remedies, the normal equitable
relief of restitution leaves open the possibility of recovering any unjust enrichment gained by
the employer. Under restitution, a plaintiff could obviously recover those benefits to which
the employee was entitled, but were denied by the employer's intentional interference with
pension benefits. For example, the Millsap plaintiffs essentially lost $24 million of pension and
medical benefits to McDonnell Douglas and as a result, the defendant was unjustly enriched
for retaining and cycling the money back into the corporate assets.
378. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
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State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its
judicial decisions. Although there is no precise line of
demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies
from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States
involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at
the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities
379
Public policy exceptions to the common law rule of employment at will are
the most commonly litigated cases, and have given rise to a significant body
of law. In one of the earliest reported cases, Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co.,38 the state supreme court agreed that "under ordinary
circumstances, an employee at will may be discharged without cause.
However, when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a
statutorily-conferred right an exception to the general rule must be
recognized.382  Most states have recognized such claims of unlawful
discharge where the firing violates what can be considered the public policy
of that state. In some cases, specific anti-retaliatory discharge provisions
were added as amendments to statutes creating positive rights.
3 3
As Justice Seymour Simon of the Illinois Supreme Court articulated
prosaically and passionately:
With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized
operations and employing relatively immobile workers who often
have no other place to market their skills, recognition that the
employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic.
In addition, unchecked employer power, like unchecked employee
power, has been seen to present a distinct threat to the public
policy carefully considered and adopted by society as a whole. As
a result, it is now recognized that a proper balance must be
maintained among the employer's interest in operating a business
efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a




379. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Il. 1981).
380. See Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim:
The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 553-55 (1986).
381. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
382. Id. at 428.
383. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (11. 1978) (protecting an
employee from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim). The Illinois
statute later specifically included a retaliatory discharge provision. See id.
384. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted).
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Naturally, a plethora of federal laws create anti-retaliation protections,
most notably the NLRA, which is the benchmark Congress created, and
later mimicked, in the federal civil rights laws .
Because ERISA governs exclusively almost any claim relating to an
employee benefit plan, workers are often denied the chance to seek relief
under more protective state and, in some cases, even federal laws.
3 6
Preemption of pension issues makes sense, since states have so far no
clearly stated public policy interest in the development and protection of
deferred compensation. But wrongful discharge and discrimination issues
have become matters of great interest and mature reflection by both state
and federal courts,3"' and simply because they are preempted by a statute
that was meant to occupy the entire field of issues that relate to employee
benefit plans does not mean state and corresponding federal
antidiscrimination and retaliation remedies should be eschewed.3 8 They
exist in other contexts as reasonable deterrents and awards.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to lay blame when a business fails, or partially closes, and long-
term employees are out of work.
385. Among the most significant federal statutes defining discrimination in employment
for exercising a right created by federal law are the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, limiting the employer's right to discriminate against union employees, see 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, setting minimum wage
and maximum hours levels, limiting child labor, prohibiting sex discrimination in wages, and
protecting any employee from retaliation for exercising or vindicating those rights, id. §§
206(a), (d), 207(a), 212(a). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Furthermore, Title
VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer to discriminate against an
employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." Id. § 2000e-3(a).
386. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 826
F. Supp. 583, 588 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). In that case the plaintiff,
an AIDS victim whose insurer had capped benefits, attempted to prevent ERISA preemption
of state antidiscrimination law by arguing that the state law functioned as an enforcement
vehicle for another federal law, the ADA. Id. at 585, 588. The court, however, rejected this
contention. Id. at 588. The case arguably shows how a broader reading of ERISA by the
federal courts may result in narrower readings of other federal statutes.
387. Indeed, the American Law Institute has appointed a committee to prepare the first
Restatement on Employment Law. See American Law Institute-Projects and Participants:
Restatement of the Law Third Employment Law, http://ali.org/ali/pp9.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2005). It is not yet clear whether the tome is forthcoming, but there certainly is a surfeit of law
out there.
388. See Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful
Discharge of At-Will Employee, 44 A.L.R.4TH 1131 (1986).
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It has always been true that if a company could not survive in the
marketplace, its employees would face the risk of termination....
But business closings are an inherent feature of a free market
economy, and the risk of job loss due to business failure has been
well understood. ... [W]hether or not their stories end happily,
employees cannot reasonably expect to remain at work when
there is nothing to produce or when the plant itself has shut
down.3 89
But specific laws that remove certain criteria for making hard business and
necessary decisions create remedies that must be considered part of the
costs of doing business. ERISA section 510 falls within that aegis of
expensive, counterintuitive, but illegal entrepreneurial decision making.
Although "the United States relies on direct legal protections only as a
second-best response" to job losses,3' 9 that is precisely the case under
section 510.
Whether Russell, Mertens, and Great-West will continue to frustrate
Congress's efforts to deter and punish unjust discharge under ERISA is not
certain. These Supreme Court decisions reflect an unworkable and static
definition of equitable remedies in many different contexts and will,
undoubtedly, not be the last word on the subject. For now, courts
considering the claims of individuals and groups whose loss of employment
is directly attributable to employer interference should be reluctant to apply
overgeneralized conclusions from disparate cases and must not conclude
that the Court's language limits all equitable relief claims coming under
389. Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for
the Restructured Employee, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2-3 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
390. Willborn, supra note 44, at 52.
If market forces can be harnessed to provide protection, that is the first (and last)
response. Especially in the context of financially distressed firms, these types of
market protections are viewed as preferable to legal protections for a number of
reasons. First, market protections create a proper set of incentives for workers by
encouraging them to focus their attention on other firms that may be able to better
accommodate them, rather than backward to the distressed firms. Second, market
protections avoid a drag on firm formation. With legal protection of jobs, firms may
be reluctant to form or expand by creating more jobs because when they create a
job, they also create a legal claim to that job by its current occupant. Thus, the lack
of legal protections contributes to the ability of workers to find replacement jobs by
expanding, at least in theory, the number of replacement jobs available. Third,
market protections encourage the socially productive movement of workers from
distressed and troubled firms to more successful firms. The first option for workers
in financially distressed firms, and maybe their only option, is to search for a more
successful firm rather than maintaining their connection to the old, troubled firm.
Having said all this, relying on market protections will leave some workers in a
bad situation. Some will not be able to find alternative jobs quickly and easily, or at
all. By assumption, they will have no legal alternative.
Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
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section 502(a)(3), regardless of the employees' relationship to the violator.
It is the public policy of this country to protect, in whatever imperfect form,
employee benefits. It makes little sense to deny that protection to the
jobholders whose tenure is cut short by the cost of those benefits, whatever
the Court's majority says.
